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How should the legal community think about double jeopardy in the
wake of the Rodney King affair?' The Double Jeopardy Clause of the
Fifth Amendment commands that no person shall "be subject for the
same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb."2 At first blush,
the federal civil rights trial of four Los Angeles police officers, following
their acquittals in state court prosecutions, might seem a patent double
jeopardy violation.3 However, the Supreme Court's dual sovereignty doc-
trine provides that two different governments' laws by definition cannot
describe the "same offence."4 This doctrine forecloses the police officers'
double jeopardy claim-the officers' first trial was for state law crimes;
the second, for federal law crimes.
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1. On April 17, 1993, a federal jury convicted Sergeant Stacey C. Koon and Officer
Laurence M. Powell of violating Rodney King's civil rights. Codefendants Timothy E. Wind
and TheodoreJ. Briseno were acquitted. See United States v. Koon, 833 F. Supp. 769, 774
(C.D. Cal. 1993), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 34 F.3d 1416 (9th Cir. 1994). The federal
trial followed a state trial that ended on April 29, 1992, in the acquittals of Koon, Wind,
and Briseno on all charges. Powell was acquitted of assault with a deadly weapon and filing
a false police report, but the jury was hung on the charge of unnecessary assault under the
color of state authority. See Chronicle Wire Services, Winning and Losing Tactics in the
Case Jurors Wouldn't Say, "Enough Is Enough", S.F. Chron., April 30, 1992, at A10.
Massive rioting began shortly after the state trial verdicts were announced.
2. U.S. Const. amend. V.
3. According to the Supreme Court, double jeopardy was historically understood as
embracing three common-law pleas-autrefois acquit, autrefois convict, and pardon-that
barred any criminal prosecution for the same crime for which defendant had already been
acquitted, convicted, or pardoned, respectively. See United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 87
(1978); United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 340 (1975); see also 4 William Blackstone,
Commentaries *329-31 (discussing these pleas, and the now moot plea, autrefois attaint); 2
William Hawkins, A Treatise of the Pleas of the Crown 368-99 (photo. reprint 1978)
(1716-1721) (similar discussion of autrefois acquit, autrefois convict, and pardon).
4. See, e.g., Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 93 (1985) (upholding death sentence in
Alabama after guilty plea in Georgia for same murder); United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S.
377 (1922) (upholding multiple prosecutions by the state and the federal government).
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Yet even if the dual sovereignty doctrine were discarded wholesale,
the officers would not be home free. The success of their claim would
still depend on the interpretation of the "same offence" language under a
different line of cases: Did the particular criminal statute at issue in the
second trial describe the same offence as the statute in the first trial, or a
different offence? The Court has struggled with the "same offence" issue
for more than a century, recently (re)adopting an approach in United
States v. Dixon5 that supplants another approach set forth only three years
before in Grady v. Corbin.6
And what are we to make of the racial composition of the first (Simi
Valley) jury, which acquitted the Los Angeles officers? Rodney King is
black, and the officers are white; but thanks in part to a defendant-
induced venue transfer, no blacks served on the firstjury. In recent cases,
the Supreme Court has vigorously reaffirmed the rights of citizens to par-
ticipate in juries free from race discrimination, and has stressed that ju-
ries must be democratically representative. 7 In light of this emerging vi-
sion, must a jury acquittal bar a fair retrial even if a defendant has
unconstitutionally manipulated the jury's racial composition?
The three Parts of this Article address these three aspects of double
jeopardy law. First, in Part I, we shall try to show that the Double
Jeopardy Clause-like the rest of the Bill of Rights-must be read
through the lens of the Fourteenth Amendment. After reviewing the
Court's various applications of the dual sovereignty doctrine before and
after the incorporation of the Bill of Rights against the states, we will
reach a key riddle: Why does the dual sovereignty doctrine still apply to
double jeopardy, but not to unreasonable searches and compelled self-
incriminations? In light of the Court's 1969 decision that the Fourteenth
Amendment incorporates the Double Jeopardy Clause against the states,8
it seems anomalous that the federal and state governments, acting in tan-
dem, can generally do what neither government can do alone-prose-
cute an ordinary citizen twice for the same offence. In response to this
anomaly we shall offer a proposal, grounded in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, to abandon the general dual sovereignty doctrine in double jeop-
ardy law. But our proposal exempts a key category of offences committed
by state officials and implicating the federal government's unique role
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. In these cases, the dual
sovereignty doctrine provides a vital federal check on state abuse of
power, in keeping with the overall structure of the Fourteenth
5. 113 S. Ct 2849 (1993).
6. 495 U.S. 508 (1990), overruled by United States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849 (1993).
7. See Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2359 (1992); Edmonson v. Leesville
Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 629-31 (1991); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 415-16 (1991);
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 99 (1986); see alsoJ.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct.
1419, 1430 (1994) (emphasizing need for democratically representative juries in a case
involving gender discrimination in the jury selection process).
8. See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
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Amendment. In short, we will argue that current dual sovereignty doc-
trine still reflects odd vestiges of Barton v. Baltimore,9 the landmark case
that the Fourteenth Amendment was clearly designed to overrule. 10 By
contrast, we will propose a "refined incorporation"" approach that re-
jects the dual sovereignty doctrine's Barronial logic, yet reaffirms its legit-
imacy in state-official cases like the one in Los Angeles.
Next, in Part II, we will expose some basic flaws in the Court's double
jeopardy jurisprudence independent of dual sovereignty issues, flaws ex-
emplified by the famous Blockburger12 test and the more recent Grady'3
and Dixon14 cases. Contrary to all these cases, and virtually all modern
scholarship, we will claim that "same offence" means just what it says. An
offence must be the "same" in both fact and law to fall within the plain
meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clause. Under this plain meaning ap-
proach, even greater and lesser included offences are, strictly speaking,
different and not the same; sometimes successive prosecution of these
offences should be allowed. On the other hand, even where different
offences are at issue, due process principles will sometimes bar successive
prosecutions. In light of all this, we will propose a new "same offence"
framework that respects the plain meaning of the Double Jeopardy
Clause, yet highlights the important role of certain due process principles
that supplement that plain meaning. And we will suggest how this same
offence/due process framework can be made to work sensibly in light of
certain special problems raised by successive prosecutions by different
governments.
Finally, in Part III, we will offer some admittedly tentative and specu-
lative thoughts on the unique role of jury acquittals in double jeopardy
law, and the special double jeopardy problems therefore posed when a
defendant manipulates a jury's democratic composition through race-
based peremptory challenges or venue transfers. Where a defendant suc-
ceeds in racially stacking the jury, arguably the resulting body is not truly
a "jury," constitutionally speaking, and thus its acquittal is not truly an
"acquittal." Under this theory, the defendant was arguably not really "in
jeopardy," and a new, constitutionally proper jury may perhaps be
convened.
In a sense, this Article is really three essays in one. Each Part exam-
ines a different facet of double jeopardy doctrine visible in the Rodney
9. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
10. See generally Michael Kent Curtis, No State Shall Abridge: The Fourteenth
Amendment and the Bill of Rights (1986); Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the
Fourteenth Amendment, 101 Yale L.J. 1193, 1218-60 (1991).
11. See generally Amar, supra note 10, at 1260-84 (setting out "refined
incorporation" theory whereby Fourteenth Amendment incorporates privileges and
immunities of individual citizens, and at times redefines the contours of those privileges
and immunities).
12. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
13. Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508 (1990).
14. United States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849 (1993).
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King affair. In each Part our analysis calls into question a basic tenet of
current double jeopardy jurisprudence; taken as a whole, this Article in-
vites a substantial rethinking of double jeopardy law. And though some
double jeopardy issues may at first seem dry and technical, they implicate
fundamental issues of constitutional law and philosophy-about the na-
ture of American federalism; the meaning of Reconstruction; divisions
within the civil rights and civil liberties community; the role of plain
meaning in constitutional interpretation; the status of race in America;
the place ofjuries in democratic theory; and tensions among democracy,
order, and individual liberty.
I. Ti DuAL SOVEREiGNT DOGrRINE
In its 1833 landmark, Barton v. Baltimore,15 the Supreme Court held
that the Federal Bill of Rights did not bind the states. Although Barton
did not explicitly address the DoubleJeopardy Clause, or the knotty ques-
tions raised by combinations of state and federal action, its basic logic
loomed large for double jeopardy dual sovereignty. If, under Barton, the
federal government could prosecute John Doe once, and a state govern-
ment could prosecuteJohn Doe as many times as it wanted, why couldn't
the two governments do in tandem what each was allowed to do alone?
The only bar, under this extension of Barron, was that the federal govern-
ment must not prosecute Doe twice for the same crime. 16
But when the Court finally repudiated Barton in the 1960s-and
held the DoubleJeopardy Clause applicable to the states in the 1969 case,
Benton v. Maryland17-this logic inverted. If the Constitution privileged
Doe against double prosecution by each government alone, why
shouldn't it also privilege him against double prosecution by both gov-
ernments together?' 8 As we shall see, the answer to this riddle lies in the
structure of the Fourteenth Amendment, which was framed to overrule
Barron.19 And when we examine that structure more closely, we will see
15. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
16. We describe this logic as an "extension" of Baron, for it was not inevitable.
Perhaps the Barron rule could have been read merely to allow state reprosecution after a
federal trial, but not vice versa. Perhaps the common-law principle, discussed infra notes
29-32 and accompanying text, that an English court would not retry a defendant after a
foreign prosecution on the same offence should have led federal courts to give similar
comity to state prosecutions-though this, too, would have been an "extension" of earlier
rules, see infra note 42.
17. 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
18. Here too, the logic is not airtight, cf. supra note 16. From the individual's
perspective, successive prosecution by separate governments looks like double jeopardy;
but from the perspective of each government, the defendant is only being held once in
jeopardy by that government. This government's eye view, however, is in tension with the
individual perspective implicit in postincorporation search and seizure and compelled self-
incrimination cases. See infra text accompanying notes 61-96. It is also in tension with the
Fourteenth Amendment's explicit accent on individual "privileges," see infra text
accompanying notes 115-118.
19. See supra note 10.
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both why the dual sovereignty doctrine should be abandoned for ordi-
nary citizens, and why it must be retained for a principled 20 subcategory
of cases involving abusive state action.
A. The Current Doctrine21
Heath v. Alabama,22 the Court's most recent exposition of the dual
sovereignty doctrine, illustrates its harshness. In this 1985 case, the Court
let Alabama prosecute Heath for murder and punish him with death after
Georgia had convicted him for the same murder and had imposed a life
sentence. 23 Under the Court's logic, Alabama could have prosecuted
Heath even if he had been acquitted at the first trial-the dual sovereignty
doctrine "compels the conclusion that successive prosecutions by two
States for the same conduct are not barred by the Double Jeopardy
Clause."24 The Court relied on the notion that states derive their power
from separate and independent sources of authority that existed prior
to admission to the Union and that were preserved by the Tenth
Amendment. 25 According to the Court, an offence defined under a
given state's power is thus different from any offence defined under the
power of any other state.
26
Heath's version of the dual sovereignty doctrine seems wooden and
one-sided, emphasizing the sovereign authority of government at the ex-
pense of an individual's interest in avoiding agonizing reprosecutions.
20. Cf. Susan N. Herman, DoubleJeopardy All Over Again: Dual Sovereignty, Rodney
King, and the ACLU, 41 UCLA L. Rev. 609, 639 (1994) ("Had a narrowly drawn, principled
exception appeared to be available for federal civil rights reprosecutions, the ACLU might
have been tempted to adopt it."). The motif of "principle" runs throughout Herman's
article. See id. at 615, 628, 632, 637-39, 647.
21. For other treatment of the dual sovereignty doctrine, see Daniel A. Braun, Praying
to False Sovereigns: The Rule Permitting Successive Prosecutions in the Age of
Cooperative Federalism, 20 Am. J. Crim. L. 1 (1992); Thomas Franck, An International
Lawyer Looks at the Bartkus Rule, 34 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1096 (1959);J.A.C. Grant, Successive
Prosecutions by State and Nation: Common Law and British Empire Comparisons, 4
UCLAL. Rev. 1 (1956) [hereinafter Grant, British Empire Comparisons];J.A.C. Grant, The
Lanza Rule of Successive Prosecutions, 32 Colum. L. Rev. 1309 (1932) [hereinafter Grant,
Successive Prosecutions]; Michael A. Dawson, Note, Popular Sovereignty, DoubleJeopardy,
and the Dual Sovereignty Doctrine, 102 Yale LJ. 281 (1992); Note, Double Prosecution by
State and Federal Governments: Another Exercise in Federalism, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1538
(1967) [hereinafter Double Prosecution].
22. 474 U.S. 82 (1985).
23. Heath had hired two men who had apparently kidnapped his wife in Alabama,
and killed her in Georgia. See id. at 83-84. No trial occurred in Georgia; Heath pled
guilty. See id. at 84.
24. Id. at 88.
25. See id. at 89.
26. See id. at 92. Tribal governments are also seen as distinct for dual sovereignty
purposes, see United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 332 (1978); but a state and its
municipalities are not seen as distinct from each other, see Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387,
395 (1970); nor is the federal government distinct from its territorial agent, see Grafton v.
United States, 206 U.S. 333, 354-55 (1907).
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From Larry Gene Heath's point of view, he certainly was being tried twice
for the same offence. The most functional rationale behind the doc-
trine-that separate sovereigns will seek to protect distinct interests27-
was arguably not even applicable in Heath: Both states were prosecuting
Heath for murder. The Court addressed this problem with a kind of defi-
nitional formalism, reasoning that every state by definition has a separate
interest in enforcing its laws.28
Constitutional history also undercuts the Heath Court's result. At the
time of both the Founding and the Reconstruction, 29 English common
law double jeopardy principles barred an English prosecution if the de-
fendant had already been tried by a foreign government. 30 In both
Founding and Reconstruction era editions of his widely read and oft-cited
treatise, Sir William Blackstone explicitly stated that "any court having
competent jurisdiction of the offence" could support a double jeopardy
plea of autrefois acquit, citing a case reaffirming the English principle re-
garding foreign prosecutions.3 1 In light of all this, Heath's result is odd
indeed; though England must respect a Georgia prosecution, Alabama
need not, despite an explicit double jeopardy provision based on English
law.32
In dissent, Justice Marshall questioned the majority's extension of
the dual sovereignty doctrine from earlier cases involving state and fed-
eral prosecutions to the state-state context of Heath.3 3 Yet he did not sug-
gest discarding the dual sovereignty doctrine wholesale because he sup-
ported its application to successive prosecutions by a state and the federal
government. The availability of federal civil rights prosecutions clearly
lay behind his argument that national interests would be frustrated if the
27. But cf. United States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849, 2858 (1993) (Scalia, J., for the
plurality) ("[Tihe distinction [between the different interests two statutes arguably serve] is
of no moment for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause, the text of which looks to
whether the offenses are the same, not the interests that the offenses violate.").
28. See Heath, 474 U.S. at 93 ("A State's interest in vindicating its sovereign authority
through enforcement of its laws by definition can never be satisfied by another State's
enforcement of its own laws.").
29. We mention the Reconstruction, of course, since the double jeopardy principle
became applicable against states, as a matter of federal constitutional law, because of the
Fourteenth Amendment. See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969); supra text
accompanying notes 17-19.
30. See Paul G. Cassell, The Rodney King Trials and the Double Jeopardy Clause:
Some Observations on Original Meaning and the ACLU's Schizophrenic Views of the Dual
Sovereign Doctrine, 41 UCLA L. Rev. 693, 710-15 (1994); Grant, British Empire
Comparisons, supra note 21, at 9.
31. See 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries *335 (emphasis added). This language
and the accompanying citation first appeared in the 5th edition, published in 1773. See 4
William Blackstone, Commentaries 335 (Oxford, Clarendon 5th ed. 1773). On the case
Blackstone cited, see Cassell, supra note 30, at 710 n.99, 711 & n.103, 715 n.126. On the
influence of Blackstone's account of double jeopardy in America, seeJay A. Sigler, Double
Jeopardy 16, 26 (1969).
32. See Cassell, supra note 30, at 711-12; supra notes 3, 31.
33. See Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 101 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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doctrine were abandoned altogether; indeed, he pointedly cited with ap-
proval the 1945 case of Screws v. United States,M4 a famous federal civil
rights criminal prosecution of a Georgia sheriff who had killed a black
man.
Yet the state-federal dual sovereignty doctrine initially arose in con-
texts rather far removed from civil rights. To trace the roots of Heath, we
must work our way back towards the Founding, to the era of Barron v.
Baltimore.35
B. The Barronial Roots of Current Doctrine
Although the Court actually applied the dual sovereignty doctrine to
a successive prosecution for the first time in 1922,36 the doctrine had
been enunciated in dicta three quarters of a century earlier. In the 1847
case of Fox v. Ohio,3 7 the Court, citing Barron, opined that successive pun-
ishment by both state and federal governments would not violate the
Fifth Amendment, since that prohibition was "exclusively [a] restriction [ ]
upon federal power."38 Five years later, in Moore v. Illinois,39 the Court
elaborated on the emerging idea of dual sovereignty:
Every citizen of the United States is also a citizen of a State or
territory. He may be said to owe allegiance to two sovereigns,
and may be liable to punishment for an infraction of the laws of
either. The same act may be an offence or transgression of the
laws of both.40
Moore argued that the very possibility of successive prosecution by the
federal government invalidated his conviction in state court, but the
Court dismissed his double jeopardy claim by viewing the word "offence"
from the government's perspective: "[I] t cannot be truly averred that the
offender has been twice punished for the same offence; but only that by
one act he has committed two offences, for each. of which he is justly
punishable."4' Justice McLean dissented in both Fox and Moore, arguing
that this notion of separate offences was a legal fiction and that it was
"contrary to the nature and genius of our government, to punish an indi-
vidual twice for the same offence."42
34. 325 U.S. 91 (1945), cited in Heath, 474 U.S. at 99 (Marshall, J., dissenting). For
further discussion of Screws, see infra notes 106-110 and accompanying text.
35. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
36. See United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377 (1922), discussed infra text
accompanying notes 43-46.
37. 46 U.S. (5 How.) 410 (1847).
38. Id. at 434; see also United States v. Marigold, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 560, 569-70 (1850)
(reaffirming Fox).
39. 55 U.S. (14 How.) 13 (1852).
40. Id. at 20.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 21 (McLean, J., dissenting); see also Fox v. Ohio, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 410,
435-40 (1847) (McLean, J., dissenting). For a brief survey of arguments-from English
law, international law, common-law treatises, and earlier Supreme Court dicta-that cut
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In 1922, the Court in United States v. Lanza43 relied on the Fox/Moore
dual sovereignty principle to uphold a federal prosecution for violation of
the National Prohibition Act after the state had convicted the defendant
for violating state Prohibition laws. The Court reiterated that, under
Barron, the Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause applied only to
proceedings by the federal government. 44 This logic left the door open
to repudiating the dual sovereignty doctrine if Barron were overruled and
the Double Jeopardy Clause were held applicable against the states. But
the Lanza majority made one further argument that would later resonate
strongly among those concerned about punishing violations of the fed-
eral civil rights laws, and would serve as a forceful reason to maintain the
dual sovereignty doctrine. Raising the specter of federal justice evaded,
the Court wrote:
If a State were to punish the manufacture, transportation and
sale of intoxicating liquor by small or nominal fines, the race of
offenders to the courts of that State to plead guilty and secure
immunity from federal prosecution for such acts would not
make for respect for the federal statute or for its deterrent
effect.
45
Without more, however, this specter cannot support the entire dual
sovereignty doctrine. Federal supremacy cannot explain why, for exam-
ple, two states may prosecute the same defendant for the same crime (as
in Heath), or why a state must be allowed to prosecute a person after he
has been acquitted in a federal prosecution. If anything, federal
supremacy might seem to cut against state prosecution in the case of a
federal acquittal. And in some cases where federal supremacy might be
threatened, perhaps other doctrines short of dual sovereignty could be
crafted.46
against Fox and Moore, see Braun, supra note 21, at 14-22; see also Cassell, supra note 30, at
708-15. These materials, however, may not be utterly dispositive. Most of them focus on
dual sovereignty in the international context and fail to focus on the unique state-federal
issues raised by American federalism, with two governments regulating the same
geographic territory and with one (the federal) supreme in its sphere over the other (the
state). In the international domain, for example, only one government would typically
have custody over the defendant at any given time. In the context of American federalism,
however, a citizen would typically be within the jurisdiction of both governments
simultaneously, creating unique race-to-the-courthouse and other problems.
Put differently, the English double jeopardy principles discussed in our analysis of
Heath, see supra text accompanying notes 30-31, are far more illuminating for state-state
dual sovereignty than for federal-state or state-federal dual sovereignty. In an otherwise
excellent essay, Professor Cassell appears to downplay this distinction. See Cassell, supra
note 30, at 708-15.
43. 260 U.S. 377 (1922).
44. See id. at 382.
45. Id. at 385; cf. supra note 42 (discussing unique race-to-courthouse issues raised in
federal-state context).
46. See Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 157 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting) (discussing
federal government's power to preempt state prosecution where federal interest
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When the Court had the chance to reassess the constitutionality of
cross-sovereign successive prosecutions in the 1959 cases of Bartkus v.
Illinois47 and Abbate v. United States,48 it simply chose to follow Barron, Fox,
Moore and Lanza. The Bartkus Court, per Justice Frankfurter, leaned
heavily on the prevailing view that the Fourteenth Amendment did not
incorporate the Double Jeopardy Clause or the rest of the Bill of Rights:
"We have held from the beginning and uniformly that the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not apply to the States any of
the provisions of the first eight amendments as such."49 The footnote
buttressing this claim cited Adamson v. California,50 the 1947 case in which
the Court spurned Justice Black's plea for total incorporation. And just
to rub it in, Frankfurter went on to insist-absurdly-that "the relevant
historical materials . . . demonstrate conclusively" that the Fourteenth
Amendment was not intended to incorporate the Bill of Rights against
the states, pointedly citing Charles Fairman's famous attack on Black's
Adamson dissent.
51
Bartkus's categorical dual sovereignty rule simply sidestepped a de-
fendant's rights; Alphonse Bartkus probably did not feel better off being
doubly prosecuted by different governments rather than by the same one.
In enforcing the Double Jeopardy Clause against reprosecution by the
same government, the Court only two years before Bartkus had vividly
painted the evils prevented by the Fifth Amendment. Government, said
the Court, may not repeatedly prosecute an individual, "thereby subject-
ing him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to
live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing
the possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty."5 2
Bartkus was subjected to precisely these harms when prosecuted by two
different governments, but the Court ignored all this. And given the in-
implicated); see also infra note 60 and text accompanying notes 59-60, 119-125
(discussing preemption and removal).
47. 359 U.S. 121 (1959). Bartkus held that the Constitution did not prohibit a state
prosecution for bank robbery following a federal acquittal for robbing the same federally
insured bank.
48. 359 U.S. 187 (1959). In Abbate federal authorities prosecuted the defendant for
conspiracy to destroy federal communications facilities after he had already pleaded guilty
to conspiracy to destroy property in state court. The Court, perJustice Brennan, upheld
the second prosecution on the authority of Lanza.
49. Bartkus, 359 U.S. at 124.
50. 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
51. See Bartkus, 359 U.S. at 124 & n.3 (citing Charles Fairman, Does the Fourteenth
Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The Original Understanding, 2 Stan. L. Rev. 5
(1949)); see also 359 U.S. at 140-49 (Court appendix relying prominently on Fairman).
On the unfairness of Fairman's article, and the absurdity of Frankfurter's claim, see Amar,
supra note 10, at 1218-60.
52. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957). Green barred the federal
government from reprosecuting the defendant for first degree murder, reasoning that a




creased level of federal-state cooperation in enforcing criminal laws,53
dual sovereign prosecutions also raised the traditional double jeopardy
concern that successive prosecutions would give government an illegiti-
mate dress rehearsal of its case and a cheat peek at the defense.
Justice Black saw successive prosecutions by separate sovereigns as
unjust, and wrote strong dissents in both Barthus and Abbate. Black, of
course, had already squared off against Frankfurter on the incorporation
issue, most famously in Adamson v. California.54 And in Bartkus and
Abbate, he refused to back away from his Adamson dissent or his commit-
ment to total incorporation.55 But even assuming the Fourteenth
Amendment did not incorporate the Fifth, Justice Black argued that suc-
cessive prosecutions violated a defendant's right to due process. 56 For
him, the Court's approval of a second trial for the same crime if con-
ducted by a different sovereign was "too subtle ... to grasp." 57 Taking
the defendant's perspective, Justice Black attacked the majority's invoca-
tion of federalism as misguided, and expressed suspicion "of any sup-
posed 'requirements' of 'federalism' which result in obliterating ancient
safeguards."58 In his view, a rule that prevented both governments from
prosecuting an individual for the same offence would in no way under-
mine the federal system.
Appreciating that federal and state interests could diverge, Black sug-
gested that the federal government could preempt the states in appropri-
ate cases.59 Although he did not elaborate on the preemption approach,
one could imagine various systems allowing federal officials to block state
prosecution of a defendant whose alleged conduct implicated paramount
federal concerns. 60
53. See Braun, supra note 21, at 7-9; Dawson, supra note 21, at 296-99.
54. 332 U.S. 46 (1947). Compare id. at 59-68 (FrankfurterJ., concurring) with id. at
68-123 (Black, J., dissenting).
55. See Bartkus, 359 U.S. at 150-51, 151 n.1 (Black, J., dissenting).
56. See id. at 150-51.
57. Id. at 155.
58. Id.; see also Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 Yale LJ. 1425
(1987) (challenging Burger Court's use of "federalism" to frustrate citizen rights and
likening federalism to separation of powers insofar as federal system provides set of vertical
checks and balances designed foremost to protect "the people" from arbitrary
government).
59. See Bartkus, 359 U.S. at 157 (Black, J., dissenting).
60. See Double Prosecution, supra note 21, at 1554-57 (discussing advantages and
drawbacks of various preemption alternatives). If the federal government believed state
action could adequately protect the federal interest, it could choose to defer to the state. A
problem arises, however, where the federal perspective before and after a state prosecution
diverges. Consider, for example, the Rodney King affair. Initially, the federal government
probably believed that the state trial would satisfy its concerns. Yet something happened
during the state prosecution that threw the fairness of the process into question, namely,
an unusual, almost unprecedented, change of venue that dramatically changed the
possible racial composition of the jury. As a consequence, the federal government
perceived a need to pursue a federal prosecution. See Paul Hoffman, Double Jeopardy
Wars: The Case for a Civil Rights "Exception", 41 UCLA L. Rev. 649, 681-86 (1994). For
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C. Incorporation and the Erosion of Dual Sovereignty
As we have seen, the logic of Barron v. Baltimore61 furnished an im-
portant justification for the early dual sovereignty doctrine: The states
were not bound by the restraints on government enumerated in the Bill
of Rights. This logic radiated beyond doublejeopardy. Before 1960, im-
munized testimony compelled from a person by federal officials could be
introduced against him in a state prosecution and vice versa, because the
Fifth Amendment Incrimination Clause62 applied only against purely fed-
eral conduct under Barron and its progeny.63 Similarly, evidence unrea-
sonably seized by state officials could constitutionally be introduced by
federal prosecutors and vice versa,64 since the Fourth Amendment exclu-
sionary rule6 5 likewise applied only to purely federal action. But in the
1960s the Barron pillar was toppled, as the Court construed the
Fourteenth Amendment to apply the Fifth Amendment's incrimination
and double jeopardy principles, and the Fourth Amendment's exclusion-
ary rule, against the states.66 Yet while the Court eventually recognized
that the Barronial dual sovereignty doctrine was no longer defensible in
the realms of unreasonable searches and compelled self-incriminations, it
more discussion, see infra text accompanying notes 119-130. Under the so-called "Petite
Policy" established in the wake of Abbate, theJustice Department will generally refrain from
prosecuting an individual after a state prosecution for the same crime, unless there are
compelling reasons for a second trial. The policy is largely reprinted in United States v.
Mechanic, 454 F.2d 849, 856 n.5 (8th Cir. 1971).
61. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
62. U.S. Const. amend. V ("No person... shall be compelled in any criminal case to
be a witness against himself").
63. See United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141 (1931); Feldman v. United States, 322
U.S. 487 (1944); Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371 (1958).
64. In Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 220-21 (1960), the Court implied that
state courts had the freedom to decide whether to admit or to exclude evidence illegally
seized by federal officials when it noted that a majority of states that had decided to
exclude evidence illegally obtained by state officials also excluded evidence unlawfully
seized by federal officials. See, e.g., State v. Arregui, 254 P. 788 (Idaho 1927); Walters v.
Commonwealth, 250 S.W. 839 (Ky. 1923); Little v. State, 159 So. 103 (Miss. 1935). But see
Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214, 216-18 (1956) (explicitly avoiding constitutional issues,
but enjoining, under Court's supervisory power, federal agents from giving testimony and
evidence to state prosecutors). On the use of evidence illegally seized by state officers in
federal courts, see infra text accompanying notes 68-75.
65. See U.S. Const. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated"); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383
(1914). Actually, the exclusionary rule was originally rooted in a fusion of the Fourth and
Fifth Amendments. See infra note 97.
66. See Elkins, 364 U.S. at 223-24 (Fourth Amendment); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961) (Fourth and Fifth Amendments); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (self-
incrimination); Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964) (self-incrimination);
Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) (double jeopardy).
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has thus far refused to dismantle the doctrine as applied to double jeop-
ardy. This apparent doctrinal inconsistency merits close study.67
1. The Silver Platter Doctrine. - In the 1960 case, Elkins v. United
States,68 the Court reexamined the silver platter doctrine, a product of
the dual sovereignty principle. For years, the doctrine permitted federal
prosecutors in federal criminal trials to use evidence unlawfully seized by
state officers and handed over to the feds on a silver platter.69 Since,
under the Barron regime, unreasonable state searches and seizures did
not violate the Federal Constitution, the silver platter doctrine posited
that using evidence obtained in those seizures in federal trials likewise
did not infringe a defendant's constitutional rights. The exclusionary
rule sought to deter and penalize overzealous behavior by federal officials
and to enforce the Federal Constitution; excluding evidence obtained by
state officials did not fit the rule's rationales.
But in 1949, Wolfv. Colorado"o changed all this by holding that the
Federal Constitution, via the Fourteenth Amendment, did indeed pro-
hibit unreasonable searches and seizures by state officers. Unreasonable
searches and seizures, whether perpetrated by federal or state officials,
violated an individual's constitutional rights. To complicate matters,
however, Wolf held that the Constitution did not require state courts to
exclude evidence improperly seized by state officials. 7 ' Nonetheless, the
Elkins Court squarely built on the rock of Wolf "[N]othing could be of
greater relevance to the present inquiry than the underlying constitu-
tional doctrine which Wolf established.... The foundation [of the silver
platter doctrine] ... -that unreasonable state searches did not violate
the Federal Constitution-thus disappeared in 1949. "72 In light of Wolf,
Elkins reasoned that "[to the victim it matters not whether his constitu-
tional right has been invaded by a federal agent or by a state officer."73
Viewing evidentiary exclusion as an apt response,74 the Elkins Court man-
dated exclusion in federal court regardless of the source of the
violation.7
5
67. For other comparisons, see Braun, supra note 21, at 47-51; Dawson, supra note
21, at 294-95; Double Prosecution, supra note 21, at 1544-49.
68. 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
69. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914).
70. 338 U.S. 25 (1949) (holding Fourth Amendment principle barring unreasonable
searches and seizures applicable against the states via the Fourteenth Amendment).
71. See, e.g., id. at 33; see also id. at 39-40 (Black, J., concurring) ("[T]he federal
exclusionary rule is not a command of the Fourth Amendment but is ajudicially created
rule of evidence .... ").
72. Elkins, 364 U.S. at 213.
73. Id. at 215.
74. But see Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 Harv. L. Rev.
757, 785-800 (1994) (suggesting that the exclusionary rule is not mandated by the
Constitution and that civil remedies such as damage actions against state officials would
better serve the Fourth Amendment's underlying principle protecting innocent people).
75. See Elkins, 364 U.S. at 223.
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The Court abandoned the dual sovereign approach because it no
longer seemed just in light of the individual's right against both govern-
ments to be immune from unreasonable searches and seizures. Almost
immediately after Elkins, the Court reached out in Mapp v. Ohio76 to ex-
tend the exclusionary rule to state courts as well. After Mapp, a dual sov-
ereignty approach would have been even less justified than after Wolf-to
employ it would have meant that the federal and state governments to-
gether could do what neither of them could do alone, namely, introduce
evidence illegally seized by government officials. Such a rule would have
been especially odd considering the increased incidence of cooperation
between federal and state law enforcement officials.
77
The tension between Elkins's 1960 rejection of silver platter dual sov-
ereignty and Bartkus's 1959 embrace of double jeopardy dual sovereignty
was obvious. Indeed, Justice Frankfurter, who authored the Bartkus ma-
jority opinion, vigorously dissented in Elkins, and three of the four jus-
tices who had joined Frankfurter's Bartkus majority opinion now joined
his Elkins dissent.78 As he had in Bartkus, Frankfurter in Elkins relied
heavily on a Barronial, anti-incorporation vision of the Fourteenth
Amendment: "[I] t is basic to the structure and functioning of our federal
system to distinguish between the specifics of the Bill of Rights of the first
eight Amendments and the generalities of the Due Process Clause .... "79
And in a short companion dissent, Justice Harlan accused the Court of
abandoning "sound constitutional doctrine under our federal scheme of
things, doctrine which only as recently as last Term was reiterated by this
Court. See Abbate v. United States... Bartkus v. Illinois .... "8 0
But with Frankfurter's departure from the Court soon after Elkins,
the Barronial edifice that he had worked so long to prop up would soon
come tumbling down-and with it, much of the logic of the dual sover-
eignty doctrine.
2. Compelled Sef-Incrimination. - Four years after Elkins's repudia-
tion of Fourth Amendment dual sovereignty, the Court abandoned dual
sovereignty in the compelled self-incrimination context. In the 1964
case, Murphy v. Waterfront Commission,8 ' the defendant had been granted
immunity under the laws of New Jersey and New York to induce him to
testify about matters before the Waterfront Commission. Murphy
76. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
77. See Elkins, 364 U.S. at 221-22; Braun, supra note 21, at 36 ("Tihis country's law
and history confirm the existence of only one sovereign people who live under a
cooperative federal system in which the distinction between state and federal authority has
grown less apparent and less important."); see also Dawson, supra note 21, at 297-99
(discussing federal/state cooperation in enforcing drug laws).
78. The fourth was Justice Stewart, whose defection from Frankfurter spelled the
difference between Bartkus's 5-4 embrace of dual sovereignty and Elkins's 5-4 rejection of
it. Stewart authored the Elkins majority.
79. Elkins, 364 U.S. at 238 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
80. Id. at 252 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
81. 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
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presented the question whether state officials could compel the defend-
ant to give testimony which could-be used to convict him for violations of
federal law. Before 1964, the answer to this questioh was "yes," because
federal Incrimination Clause principles did not apply against the states,
But in 1964 Malloy v. Hogan82 incorporated the Incrimination Clause, re-
jecting the notion that the Fourteenth Amendment applied to the states
"only a 'watered-down, subjective version of the individual guarantees of
the Bill of Rights.' "83
Decided on the same day as Malloy, Murphy leaned heavily on that
case: "Our decision today in Malloy v. Hogan... necessitates reconsidera-
tion of this [dual sovereignty in self-incrimination] rule."8 4 Especially in
light of Malloy, "there is no continuing legal vitality to, or historical justifi-
cation for, the rule that one jurisdiction... may compel a witness to give
testimony which could be used to convict him of a crime in another juris-
diction."85 The Court reasoned that the policies behind the privilege
would be frustrated by the dual sovereignty doctrine, which allowed a de-
fendant to be "'whipsawed into incriminating himself under both state
and federal law even though' the constitutional privilege against self-in-
crimination is applicable to each."86 The expanding federal effort to
fight crime had brought about a new age of cooperative federalism; this
development made the Court's holding essential to protecting the privi-
lege.8 7 Murphy thus ruled that a state witness could not be compelled to
testify unless the compelled testimony and its fruits88 would not be used
against him in any manner by federal prosecutors.8 9
82. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
83. Id. at 10-11 (quoting Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263, 275 (1960)).
84. Murphy, 378 U.S. at 57.
85. Id. at 77. The Murphy Court also prominently discussed Elkins as undermining the
conceptual foundations of self-incrimination dual sovereignty. See id. at 74-75.
86. Id. at 55 (quoting Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371, 385 (1958) (Black, J.,
dissenting)).
87. See Murphy, 378 U.S. at 55-56.
88. The Court cited Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892), in support of its
position, see Murphy 378 U.S. at 54, though it appeared to be reinterpreting Counselman,
which had traditionally been cited for the rule that a witness properly invoking his Fifth
Amendment privilege must be given "transactional" immunity barring all prosecution for
any matters about which he testified. See Stephen A. Saltzburg & Daniel J. Capra,
American Criminal Procedure: Cases and Commentary 484 (4th ed. 1992). Murphy's
language appears to anticipate the Court's decision almost a decade later in Kastigar v.
United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972), where the Court narrowed the immunity available
under Counselman, holding that the government could compel incriminating testimony
from a witness if it granted a form of "use and use-fruits" immunity that ensured that
neither the witness's testimony nor its "fruits" (i.e., what the testimony led investigators to
discover) could be used against him in a criminal trial. See id. at 453. Under Kastigar, the
government could successfully prosecute a witness on matters about which he testified, so
long as it could prove that the incriminating evidence was discovered independently of his
testimony. See id. at 460. For further discussion, see Murphy, 378 U.S. at 92-107 (White,
J., concurring).
89. See Murphy, 378 U.S. at 78-79.
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The Murphy decision in effect adopted the dissenting position justice
Black had taken twenty years before in Feldman v. United States.90 Feldman
held that a defendant's compelled testimony in a state proceeding,
though not admissible in a state prosecution, could be used in federal
court to convict the defendant of a federal crime. Authored by Justice
Frankfurter, the Feldman majority opinion erected its dual sovereignty ed-
ifice on the foundation of Barron, invoking the landmark case as estab-
lishing "one of the settled principles of our Constitution."91 And just as
Justice Black would later challenge Frankfurter's Barronial logic in
Adamson v. California92 and Bartkus,93 so in his Feldman dissent, he offered
up a different vision of federalism and the Bill of Rights:
Within its [the Fifth Amendment's] sweeping prohibition are
found no exceptions based upon the persons who compel, their
purpose in compelling, or their method-of compelling .... Tes-
timony is no less compelled because a state rather than a federal
officer compels it, or because the state officer appears to be pri-
marily interested at the moment in enforcing a state rather than
a federal law.
94
Justice Black sounded the same theme in his double jeopardy dis-
sents in Bartkus and Abbate; and his one-paragraph concurrence in the
1964 Murphy case95 cited these dissents, as well as his Adamson and
Feldman dissents. Yet the Court never reversed its double jeopardy dual
sovereignty cases, even after it incorporated the Double Jeopardy Clause
against the states in the 1969 case, Benton v. Maryland.
96
Here, then, is the key puzzle: Whereas Elkins consciously built on
Wolf's application of Fourth Amendment principles against states to over-
turn the silver platter doctrine, and Murphy explicitly built on Malloy's
incorporation of the Incrimination Clause to overturn Feldman, the Court
never chose to build on Benton's incorporation of the Double Jeopardy
Clause to overturn Bartkus and Abbate. The Court has never explained-
or even focused on-this anomaly.
90. 322 U.S. 487, 494-503 (1943) (Black, J., dissenting).
91. Id. at 490 (majority opinion).
92. 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
93. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959). For a discussion of Black's position in
Adamson and Bartkus, see supra text accompanying notes 54-58. Even before Feldman,
Black had announced his belief that the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to
incorporate the Bill of Rights against states, see Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 474-75, 474
n.1 (1942) (Black, J., dissenting). For a still earlier hint of Black's maturing views on the
Fourteenth Amendment, see Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 235 n.8 (1940).
94. Feldman, 322 U.S. at 497 (Black,J., dissenting). The Frankfurter-Black debate over
dual sovereignty and self-incrimination was replayed in Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371
(1958).
95. See Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 80 (1964) (Black, J.,
concurring).
96. 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
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D. Reconstructing Double Jeopardy
The Supreme Court, in decisions such as Elkins and Murphy, ap-
peared to be moving steadily towards Justice Black's position, but never
took the final step of discarding the dual sovereignty doctrine altogether.
As we have seen, incorporation undermined a central justification for the
dual sovereignty doctrine. Indeed, Elkins and Murphy stand for the pro-
positions that (1) the Fourteenth Amendment's emphasis on individual
rights against all government trumps abstract notions of federalism, and
(2) the federal and state governments should not be allowed to do in
tandem what neither could do alone. Yet the dual sovereignty doctrine is
still alive and well in double jeopardy cases, in seeming violation of these
propositions. Why?
97
1. The Section 5 Exception. - Perhaps a, practical and structural con-
cern justifies the seemingly inconsistent deployment of the dual sover-
eignty doctrine: the fear that states might frustrate the federal govern-
ment's ability to protect its interests. Although state officials could try to
sabotage a federal prosecution by illegally seizing evidence or by promis-
ing a suspect immunity in exchange for testimony, a federal trial would
still be possible, though perhaps more difficult.98 But in the doublejeop-
97. It might be thought that the answer lies in the technical distinction between right
and remedy: In the Fourth Amendment context, the first government's search and seizure
undeniably violated a citizen's right, and the second government is barred from using the
evidence uncovered as a remedial matter;, but in the double jeopardy context, a citizen's
right against dual prosecution by the same government was never violated. This technical
distinction will not wash here. First, it cannot explain Murphy, which concerned the scope
of the immunity to be promised a witness before he spoke. The Murphy Court explicitly
rejected the technical argument that no constitutional violation would occur so long as
one's compelled testimony would never be used by the same government that compelled
it. See Murphy, 378 U.S. at 57 & n.6. Also, the technical distinction cannot make full sense
of Elkins, which was decided at a time when exclusion of evidence was seen not merely as a
Fourth Amendment remedy, but also as a prevention of a Fifth Amendment violation that
would occur at trial. See Amar, supra note 74, at 787-91. For evidence of this Fourth-Fifth
fusion, see, e.g., Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630, 633-35 (1886); Weeks v. United
States, 232 U.S. 383, 393, 395 (1914); Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 306, 311
(1921); Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313, 315-16 (1921); Aguello v. United States, 269
U.S. 20, 33-35 (1925); Gambino v. United States, 275 U.S. 310, 316 (1927); Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438, 477-78 (1928) (Brandeis,J., dissenting); Feldman, 322 U.S. at
489-90; Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 646-47, 646 n.5, 656-57 (1961); id. at 661-66 (Black,
J., concurring); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1964); Murphy, 378 U.S. at 74. Finally,
this technical distinction cannot account for the language in Elkins and Murphy affirming
propositions (1) and (2), and stressing cooperative federalism. See supra text accom-
panying notes 72-77 and 85-87.
98. On the current form of the "use and use-fruits" immunity now required by the
Court in the Kastigar case, see supra note 88. The broader the immunity conferred upon
the witness, the more difficult it is subsequently to prosecute. The Oliver North case
provides a telling example. The Independent Counsel prosecuted North after he testified
before Congress under a grant of use immunity. Although the prosecution succeeded in
securing conviction on several counts, the D.C. Circuit reversed the convictions, ruling that
the prosecution did not establish that the evidence and testimony it proffered were derived
from a source independent of North's congressional testimony. See United States v.
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ardy context, a defendant would claim that after a state acquittal, pardon,
or handslapping conviction, he is wholly immune from federal prosecu-
tion for the same offence. Thus, discarding the dual sovereignty doctrine
in double jeopardy cases would work a far bigger impairment of federal
power: A state in effect would be able to veto a federal prosecution.
This practical and structural concern can be tightly repackaged as a
Fourteenth Amendment argument. The Amendment was clearly
designed to protect ordinary citizens from abusive action by state offi-
cials;99 one way it did this was by empowering the federal government to
prosecute abusive state officials. Indeed, the Amendment's Section 5100
was paradigmatically about federal criminal law enforcement of Section
1.101 Because Section 1 is largely self-executing on the civil side,10 2 the
biggest role for Section 5 exists in criminal law: since there is no self-
executing federal common law of crimes,'03 Section 5 was necessary to
provide for proper criminal enforcement of Section 1. More specifically,
Congress designed Section 5 to support the Civil Rights Bill of 1866,
which included a key criminal provision directed at abusive state officials
North, 920 F.2d 940, 942 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (Kastigar is violated "whenever the prosecution
puts on a witness whose testimony is shaped, directly or indirectly, by compelled testimony,
regardless of how or by whom he was exposed to that compelled testimony"), cert. denied,
500 U.S. 941 (1991). With the hurdle raised so high, the Independent Counsel chose not
to reprosecute.
It is far from clear that Kastigar's broad use and use-fruits immunity is constitutionally
compelled; so long as the compelled testimony itself is not admitted, the Fifth Amendment
is probably not violated. In fact, many state courts in the nineteenth century considered
the "fruits" of compelled testimony admissible evidence. See Ex parte Rowe, 7 Cal. 184,
185-86 (1857) (upholding immunity statute that merely prevented direct use of
compelled testimony itself in criminal trial); Wilkins v. Malone, 14 Ind. 153, 156-57 (1860)
(facts revealed by immunized testimony may be proved against witness in his later criminal
trial, "although the confessions are wholly inadmissible"); People v. Kelly, 24 N.Y. 74
(1861) (suspect can be obliged to lead officials to evidence they would otherwise be
ignorant of, and that evidence may then be used against suspect in a criminal case);
LaFontaine v. Southern Underwriters Ass'n, 83 N.C. 132 (1880) (witness not protected
from furnishing means of procuring evidence against him); Ex parte Buskett, 17 S.W. 753
(Mo. 1891) (privilege does not prevent government from obliging suspect to identify other
witnesses to crime, who may then testify against suspect). This also appears to be the view
of Congress at the time it adopted the Fourteenth Amendment, reglossing the Bill of
Rights. See Act ofJan. 24, 1862, ch. 11, 12 Stat. 333 (1862); Cong. Globe, 37th Cong., 2d
Sess. 429 (1862) (remarks of Senator Benjamin Wade). Because the fruits of compelled
testimony have independent indicia of reliability, they should not necessarily be treated
the same as the testimony itself. See generally Akhil Reed Amar & Ren~e B. Lettow, Fifth
Amendment First Principles: The Self-Incrimination Clause, 93 Mich. L. Rev.
(forthcoming 1995).
99. See generally Amar, supra note 10; Curtis, supra note 10, at 57-91.
100. Section 5 provides: "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 5.
101. See infra notes 104-105.
102. Cf. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388 (1971) (persons may sue federal officials for damages directly under the Fourth
Amendment).
103. See United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Pet.) 32 (1812).
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(and only state officials). 1°4 In light of this clear history, it would be
highly ironic if federal criminal prosecution of abusive state officials
under the Act of 1866 could be blocked by-of all things-the
Fourteenth Amendment itself.
Structurally, the Fourteenth Amendment must be viewed as both a
shield and a sword. Section I serves as a shield insofar as it gives ordinary
individuals rights against all government and enhanced protection
against discrimination. And Section 5 provides the sword with which the
federal government can combat state abuses against citizens. 105 Yet if a
state could pardon or acquit or lightly punish its own abusive officials and
thereby immunize them from federal prosecution, Section 5 could be
thwarted. The narrow double jeopardy rights of a handful of officials
would undermine the Fourteenth Amendment's global scheme of pro-
tecting ordinary citizens against a wide range of state abuse. This con-
104. See Civil Rights Act, ch. 31, § 2, 14 Stat. 27, 27 (1866); see also Curtis, supra note
10, at 82 (quoting RepresentativeJohn Bingham, drafter of the Fourteenth Amendment):
I have advocated here an amendment which would arm Congress with the power to
compel obedience to the oath [to support, protect, and defend the Constitution],
and punish all violations by State officers of the bill of rights, but leaving those
officers to discharge the duties enjoined upon them as citizens of the United
States by that oath and by that Constitution.
(emphasis added). Bingham believed that Congress needed the Fourteenth Amendment's
grant of authority to enact the Civil Rights Bill. See Richard L. Aynes, On MisreadingJohn
Bingham and the Fourteenth Amendment, 103 Yale LJ. 57, 72-73 (1993).
105. The paradigmatic case for a Section 5 prosecution in the 1860s would have
involved state officials as criminal defendants. It is also possible that a widespread state
failure to prosecute private parties, who, say, preyed on blacks, would at some point have
been seen as a classic state failure to provide equal protection of the laws, therebyjustifying
direct federal prosecution of those private parties. See Jacobus tenBroek, Equal Under
Law 51-54, 117-18, 201-29 (1965); Earl M. Maltz, Civil Rights, the Constitution, and
Congress 1863-1869, at 102-06 (1990). This justification, however, might not be available
in the case of an isolated acquittal, no matter how outrageous, as it would be difficult to
prove an overall failure of protection. For such cases, we propose instead to focus on jury
selection issues, see infra Part III-a focus in harmony with the Fifteenth Amendment's
insistence that blacks be allowed to vote equally with whites, on juries and elsewhere. As
Part III makes clear, the problem of skewed juries transcends issues of federalism and the
dual sovereignty doctrine, and could perhaps justify a second prosecution by the same
sovereign entitled to one fair trial and one fair jury.
The Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment also invited direct
congressional legislation over private persons; but it is not clear how much federal criminal
legislation against private parties was initially envisioned to enforce the citizenship ideal.
The Act of 1866 provided for black citizenship, but laid down no federal criminal law
against private parties. The first congressional acts criminalizing private conduct under
the Reconstruction Amendments, the Voting Rights Act of 1870, ch. CXIV, § 6, 16 Stat.
140, 141, and the Ku Klux Act of 1871, ch. XXII, § 2, 17 Stat. 13, 13-14, were not adopted
until well afler the Fourteenth Amendment had been proposed and ratified; and some of
the key criminal provisions of the latter Act were soon struck down on "state action"
grounds as beyond Congress's Section 5 power, see United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629,
638-39 (1882). More recently, the Court has upheld counterpart civil language of the Ku
Klux Act, but by relying on congressional power under the Thirteenth, and not the
Fourteenth, Amendment. See Griffin v. Breckeridge, 403 U.S. 88, 104-07 (1971).
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cern can be teased out of Bartkus and Abbate; in the course of upholding
dual sovereign successive prosecutions, both of these key cases cited
Screws v. United States,'0 6 a federal criminal civil rights prosecution, under
18 U.S.C. § 242, of a Georgia state sheriff who had beaten a black man to
death. Section 242 is the modem-day incarnation of the criminal provi-
sion of the Civil Rights Bill of 1866-and was the key criminal statute at
issue in the federal trial of the Los Angeles officers.
10 7
Thus, where the federal government is exercising its power pursuant
to Section 5 to prosecute tyrannical state officials, as in the prosecution of
the Los Angeles police officers, the dual sovereignty doctrine retains va-
lidity: it makes structural sense even after the Fourteenth Amendment is
added to the original Bill of Rights and Barron is generally repudiated.
Under a "refined incorporation" approach, the Fourteenth Amendment,
in the process of making certain "privileges" and "immunities" applicable
against the states, also helps to shape (and reshape) the contours of those
privileges and immunities.108 On the dual sovereignty issue, as else-
where, Justice Black's approach to incorporation was largely right, but
too mechanical, obscuring the ways in which Fourteenth Amendment val-
ues must influence the precise shape of Bill of Rights doctrines. 10 9 Read
as a whole, the Fourteenth Amendment calls for the general demolition
of dual sovereignty to protect ordinary citizens from being whipsawed
(Justice Black's insight), yet preserves the legitimacy of dual prosecutions
against those state officials who themselves violate other citizens'
Fourteenth Amendment rights (the insight of Screws affirmed by Justice
Marshall). In sum, the dual sovereignty doctrine, while rendered largely
obsolete by the Fourteenth Amendment, still has a narrow but crucial
role to play in enforcing the Reconstruction values of that same
Amendment against state officials.110
106. 325 U.S. 91 (1945); see Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 137 (1959) (citing
Screws); Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 195 (1959) (citing Screws).
107. See United States v. Koon, 833 F. Supp. 769, 774 (C.D. Cal. 1993), aff'd in part,
vacated in part, 34 F.3d 1416 (1994).
108. See generally Amar, supra note 10. In important respects, the Fourteenth
Amendment's declaration of "privileges" and "immunities" glossed the earlier declaration
of rights in the federal Bill of Rights. Even when solely federal action is at stake, we must
consult not only the Founding vision articulated in the original Bill of Rights, but also the
Reconstruction vision enacted in the Fourteenth Amendment. This is the so-called
"feedback effect" of the Fourteenth Amendment on the original Bill. See id. at 1281-82;
Akhil Reed Amar, Constitutional Rights in a Federal System: Rethinking Incorporation
and Reverse Incorporation, in Benchmarks: Great Constitutional Controversies in the
Supreme Court (Terry Eastland ed., forthcoming 1995) (manuscript at 14-20, on file with
Columbia Law Review).
109. Cf. Amar, supra note 10, at 1275, 1282.
110. Indeed, according to a 1979 opinion, 28 out of 43 recent federal prosecutions
after state trials involved civil rights offences. See United States v. Hayes, 589 F.2d 811, 819
(5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 847 (1979). (The Hayes court, however, did
not indicate whether any of these cases involved purely private action.)
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In this sense, the alleged constitutional offence committed by state
officials will always uniquely implicate the federal government's authority.
The Fourteenth Amendment embodied a check on state abuse and Sec-
tion 5 made clear that whatever the state could accomplish in the way of
self-enforcement would not necessarily satisfy the federal government,
which would function as the sole external check. Therefore any offence
charged by the state against its own official cannot be interpreted to be
the same offence as the Fourteenth Amendment violation charged by the
federal government. It is only in this context that the dual sovereignty
doctrine's definitional formalism serves an important federalism function
by protecting the liberty and equality of the great mass of citizens."'
2. A Separation of Powers Analogy. - Like federalism, separation of
powers is a scheme to divide government power and thereby protect citi-
zen liberty. 112 The obvious separation of powers analogy to our proposed
Section 5 exception is impeachment. In order to protect ordinary citi-
zens from tyranny and government lawlessness, our Constitution allows a
handful of federal officials to be subject to two prosecutions for their
crimes-one in a quasi-criminal court of impeachment and a second in
an ordinary criminal prosecution. Indeed, the Impeachment Clause of
Article I, Section 3 plainly contemplates that ordinary double jeopardy
principles should not apply so that liberty more generally will be
protected:
Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further
than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and
enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United
States: but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and sub-
ject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to
Law.1"3
Another way of viewing the problem is through the lens of waiver or
forfeiture. Just as anyone who accepts a federal office effectively forfeits
objection to successive impeachment and ordinary criminal prosecution,
so too state officials forfeit the general protection granted by the
Fourteenth Amendment against crossjurisdictional prosecutions because
111. Our claim is not that Section 5 allows Congress to repeal or restrict the rights
proclaimed in Section 1. Cf. Cassell, supra note 30, at 707 (noting this possible reading of
Section 5). For example, Congress could not authorize states to prosecute an ordinary
citizen twice for the same crime. Nor could Congress itself prosecute a citizen twice, or
violate any other command of the Bill of Rights, simply by pointing to Section 5. Rather,
our argument is that when'Section 1 is read in light of Section 5, Section 1 itself is best
understood as not giving state officials the same immunity from dual sovereign double
prosecution that it gives ordinary citizens. Nor did the Supreme Court's Fifth Amendment
case law, against which the Reconstruction Congress acted, offer state officials any dual
sovereignty immunity prior to 1866. See supra text accompanying notes 37-41. And on
the "feedback effect" implications of Section 1 for federal rather than state action, see
supra note 108.
112. For elaboration of this analogy and additional discussion of how both federalism
and separation of powers protect citizen liberty, see Amar, supra note 58, at 1492-1520.
113. U.S. Const. art. I, § 3, cl. 7 (emphasis added).
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of the awesome monopoly of power they wield over others, and the
unique constitutional strictures in place to prevent the abuse of that awe-
some power.
3. Refined Incorporation and Its Critics. - A refined incorporation ap-
proach to double jeopardy-eliminating dual sovereignty generally, yet
retaining it for Section 5 prosecutions of state officials-can be criticized
as protecting defendants (1) too much; (2) too little; or (3) in an unprin-
cipled, ad hoc way. We take up these three possible criticisms in turn.
a. Too Much Protection? - From the defendant's perspective, two
prosecutions look like double jeopardy, even if each prosecution comes
from a different government. But from the governments' perspective,
each has arguably complied with the double jeopardy mandate: Each
government has prosecuted the defendant once and only once. Incorpo-
ration, it might be argued, should mean no more than this.
114
But there are two problems with that approach."15 First, it is incon-
sistent with the individual defendant perspective underlying the incorpo-
ration-driven repudiation of dual sovereignty in the Fourth Amendment
and self-incrimination contexts. 1 6 Second, the letter and spirit of the
Fourteenth Amendment seem to lean towards an individual perspec-
tive-to privilege "privileges." The text of the Amendment focuses not
merely on the limits of government power, but the rights and freedoms-
the "privileges and immunities"-of individuals. And the spirit of the
Amendment was to affirm individual rights against all governments, state
and federal. 117 Indeed, the broad history underlying the Amendment
foreshadowed modem day cooperative federalism between state and fed-
eral governments. As one of us has observed elsewhere:
In some situations, the very line separating state and federal
government began to blur. We have already seen in passing the
tricky double jeopardy questions raised when both state and fed-
eral governments prosecuted a defendant for the same underly-
ing conduct; but the free press clause posed an analogous puz-
zle that received far more public attention. In the 1830's,
various states sought to ban "incendiary" publications and
wanted federal officials to cooperate by closing the malls to such
publications. Would such censorship constitute federal action
violative of the First Amendment or state action beyond the
Amendment's scope?
To an increasing number of friends of free speech, this
knotty question, even if answerable, seemed to miss the point.
Why should the right of citizens to publish controversial views
114. Cf. supra note 18.
115. Professor Cassell has identified a third, in the English rule that foreign trials bar
domestic reprosecutions. For our reasons for not finding this rule utterly dispositive for
federal-state and state-federal successive prosecutions, see supra note 42.
116. See supra Part I.C.
117. See generally Amar, supra note 10.
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turn on fine legal distinctions about which government's hands
had really wielded the censor's red pen?1 8
In light of this, many framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, if
asked, might have considered it wholly fair and reasonable that one gov-
ernment in a federal system could be barred from prosecuting an ordi-
nary citizen because of the action of another government-especially in a
world featuring strong cooperation between federal and state govern-
ment in investigating and prosecuting crime.
But to see the logic of the general abolition of double jeopardy dual
sovereignty is also to see the logic's limit: Section 5 prosecutions. On
individual liberty grounds, ordinary citizens will be worse off if any state
can thwart federal criminal prosecution of that state's abusive officials.
And on cooperative federalism grounds, we should not presume identity
or privity of interest between state and federal governments, where the
feds are trying to put state officials behind bars. Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment suggests a special role for Congress in enforcing
the Amendment's mandate against state officials; and state governments
should not be allowed to thwart that role by immunizing their own
officials.
b. Too Little Protection? - An opposite criticism would applaud the
general abolition of dual sovereignty, but resist an exception for Section
5 defendants. Even government officials have constitutional rights. Why
should the Los Angeles police officers be denied the same double jeop-
ardy rights that everyone else enjoys?
Our answer, of course, is that in dealing with wrongdoing by its own
state officials, a state government is categorically less trustworthy than
elsewhere; the cooperative federalism logic driving our proposed aboli-
tion of general dual sovereignty breaks down here. In response, a critic
might point to two alternative mechanisms short of a categorical Section
5 exemption-preemption and removal-to assure federal supremacy
over possible state obstructionism. But neither works all that well.
Consider first total federal preemption. If Congress prevented states
from enacting state criminal counterparts to federal civil rights laws like
Section 242, the state obstruction problem would disappear. There
would be no state crime leading to acquittal, handslapping conviction, or
pardon; and thus no double jeopardy bar to federal prosecution. But this
is like preventing high blood pressure by ripping out a person's heart.
The Fourteenth Amendment did not always trust states to police their
own officers, but it did want states to try.'1 9 Federal enforcement of the
Fourteenth Amendment would be paramount, but not exclusive. Surely,
states should also enforce the Amendment, and play an important
(though not ultimate) role in punishing criminally abusive state offi-
118. Id. at 1214.
119. See infra note 125 and accompanying text.
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cials. 120 Federal prosecution would serve as a backstop, rather than a first
resort.
Now consider removal. Under this model, states are welcome to
criminalize abusive state action, but in any case where federal prosecutors
anticipate whitewash or obstruction, they would be obliged to prosecute
first-either by initiating a federal prosecution from scratch, or by remov-
ing a state prosecution from state court. Federal supremacy would be
fully preserved, but defendant would undergo only one trial.
Wrong. So long as state criminal laws are on the books, removal can-
not guarantee federal supremacy. A state governor may typically pardon
an abusive state official at any time after the crime-even before trial.' 21
And state pardon is nowadays just as good a double jeopardy plea as state
acquittal or state conviction:122 All three bar a federal prosecution for
the same offence if dual sovereignty is abandoned across the board. And
if we tinker with the dual sovereignty doctrine to allow a "Section 5 par-
don" exception, the obvious elegance underlying the claim that "police
officers should have the same double jeopardy rights as everyone else" is
lost. Indeed, one good exception deserves another-and there are
sound structural reasons to expand a Section 5 pardon exception into a
more general Section 5 exception. For sometimes state obstruction or
whitewash will emerge only during a state trial, not before. 123 To mini-
mize Section 5's disruption of traditional principles of federalism, the
federal government should be allowed to give a state the first crack at
putting its own house in order.' 24 Only if and when that attempt has
failed to vindicate Fourteenth Amendment values is federal prosecution
of state officials indicated. Indeed, John Bingham, the father of the
Fourteenth Amendment, rather clearly thought that its primary enforce-
ment would rest with the states, with federal criminal punishment of "all
violations by State officers of the bill of rights" as a backstop.' 25 And so
120. See Laurie L. Levenson, The Future of State and Federal Civil Rights
Prosecutions: The Lessons of the Rodney King Trial, 41 UCLA L. Rev. 509, 586-99 (1994);
cf. Akhil Reed Amar, The Case of the Missing Amendments: RA.V v. City of St. Paul, 106
Harv. L. Rev. 124, 155 (1992) (suggesting role for both state and federal governments in
enforcing Thirteenth Amendment).
121. For the sound policy reasons why pardons should be permissible any time after a
crime occurs, see The Federalist No. 74 (Alexander Hamilton) (immediate pardon may be
necessary to induce ongoing law-breakers to stop).
122. See supra note 3.
123. In the Rodney Kirig case itself, for example, one group of state officials (state
judges) ended up conferring a highly unusual and suspicious litigation benefit (a venue
transfer from Los Angeles County to Ventura County) to another group of state officials
(the four police officers). For an eyebrow-raising analysis, see Hoffman, supra note 60, at
681-86. For a discussion of possible justifications for the transfer, see infra text
accompanying note 257.
124. See Levenson, supra note 120, at 586-99.
125. Quoted supra note 104. For broad historical support for a backstop federalism




we are once again led back to our proposed Section 5 exception-for
state court acquittals and handslapping convictions, as well as for state
pardons.
But here too, we see an important limiting principle that should pro-
hibit federal reprosecution outside the confines of Section 5. Our Sec-
tion 5 exemption implicates possible government self-dealing: a state is
applying criminal law against its own officials. But outside this self-deal-
ing situation, states generally may be presumed trustworthy enforcers of
criminal law. In the few areas where this may not be so, preemption or
removal seem more workable-especially where supplemented by the un-
fettered ability to directly prosecute obstructionist state officials (an abil-
ity created by the Section 5 exception itself) 126-and less likely to under-
mine vigorous enforcement of the Constitution itself.
To put the point another way, our proposal simply recasts two gen-
eral double jeopardy principles in light of the unique federalism architec-
ture of the Fourteenth Amendment. Even in BartkusJustice Frankfurter
allowed that if a state and the federal government were genuinely acting
in collusive partnership-if the state prosecution were a "sham and a
cover for a federal prosecution"-double jeopardy might bar retrial. 127
But proving this high degree of state/federal cooperation and collusion
has become an almost insurmountable burden for ordinary defendants in
later cases. 128 Our general proposed abolition of dual sovereignty re-
lieves this case-specific burden by presuming extensive cooperation be-
tween the two governments, in keeping with the broad Fourteenth
Amendment vision protecting "privileges" against all governments. But
where state officials are the targets of prosecution, an opposing general
double jeopardy principle becomes salient: an acquittal or handslapping
conviction procured by fraud or collusion of defendant with the purpose
of avoiding a fair and impartial trial does not bar reprosecution. 129 But
once again, this is a very hard thing to prove in any given case. (Some of
the pro-defendant rulings in the initial state prosecution of the L.A. po-
lice officers smell fishy,'30 but conclusive proof of collusion is hard to
come by.) Our proposed Section 5 exception reads the Constitution it-
126. See infra text accompanying notes 140-141. Without this exception, a governor
could thwart a federal trial of a private citizen with a pardon, and if he himself were then
charged with criminal obstruction by the feds, he could try to pardon himself, or
(temporarily?) step down and be pardoned by his lieutenant governor, who could in turn
be pardoned.., and so on, with one state hand washing itself or the other.
127. See Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 124 (1959).
128. Lower courts have read Barthus's language to create a "sham and a cover"
exception to the dual sovereignty rule, but have almost never found the "exception" met
on the facts of a given case. See Braun, supra note 21, at 59-60; but cf. United States v.
Belcher, 762 F. Supp. 666, 670-71 (W.D. Va. 1991) (applying Bartkus "sham and cover"
exception to bar federal prosecution after state acquittal), request for modification denied,
769 F. Supp. 201 (W.D. Va. 1991).
129. See 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 217 (1989). For much more discussion of this
principle, see infra Part III.
130. See supra note 123.
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self to presume possible state/defendant self-dealing when state officials
are involved, thereby puncturing the Constitution's default presumption
of cooperative federalism between a state and the feds.' 31
c. Too Ad Hoc? - Many academic and judicial critics of double jeop-
ardy dual sovereignty have tended to stake out an intellectually pure, but
extreme, position: The doctrine must be abandoned lock, stock, and bar-
rel.132 However, in a recent article elaborating and defending the posi-
tion taken by the ACLU of Southern California in the Rodney King affair,
Director Paul Hoffman has urged that dual sovereignty be abandoned
subject to an exception for "civil rights" cases.' 3 3 In response, Professor
Susan Herman has defended the national ACLU's traditional position of
total abolition of dual sovereignty.' 34 She levels two main criticisms
against Hoffman.
First, Herman finds in the framing of the Fourteenth Amendment
no specific smoking gun historical evidence supporting a specific "civil
rights" exception. Reconstruction Republicans plainly envisioned federal
criminal prosecution of abusive state officials, she concedes; but, she asks,
did the framers clearly approve of federal reprosecution after a state
trial?' 3 5 With due respect, this is the wrong question, and no answer is
what the wrong question begets. The Fourteenth Amendment framers
clearly did mean to apply the Bill of Rights generally against the states,
but did not "carefully consider[ ] clause by clause exactly how the Bill
could be sensibly incorporated." 136 Double jeopardy received little ex-
plicit attention, and the intricacies of double jeopardy dual sovereignty
received none. At this level of historical specificity, Herman is hoist by
her own petard; though the Fourteenth Amendment framers did intend
to apply double jeopardy principles against states, there is no specific evi-
dence that they clearly addressed dual sovereignty, much less that they
clearly approved the modem ACLU line. Republicans explicitly meant to
repudiate Barron, but did incorporators mean that each government
could prosecute only once (dual sovereignty), or that all governments,
collectively, could prosecute only once (the ACLU line)? The answer to
this question is to be found in sensitive structural inferences rather than
131. A case-by-case rather than categorical approach is imaginable, but the categorical
approach more closely tracks both the impeachment analogy, and the reasons that support
a rule-like, categorical approach to the "same offence" issue within a single jurisdiction, see
infra text accompanying notes 192-193, 199-205.
132. See, e.g., Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 150-64 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting);
Cassell, supra note 30, at 708-19; Grant, Successive Prosecutions, supra note 21, at
1329-31; Herman, supra note 20, at 618-27.
133. See Hoffman, supra note 60, at 661-71. Hoffman's proposed exception is at
times defended as a legislative proposal, and at other times as an interpretation of the
Constitution itself. See id. at 670-71.
134. See Herman, supra note 20, at 632-39.
135. See id. at 633.




smoking gun historical soundbites. And the same holds true for a Sec-
tion 5 exception.
13 7
Herman's second concern is more telling. What are the contours
and limits of Hoffman's proposed "civil rights" exception? Hoffman has
pointedly declined to limit his proposed exception to state officials, or
even race cases;' 38 at this point, Herman smells a rat. "Civil rights" might
mean anything or everything, and an ill-defined exception could swallow
the rule (at least in all state-federal multiple prosecutions).139 Most crim-
inal law, after all, is designed to protect victims in their "civil rights" to
life, liberty, or property.
By contrast, our proposed Section 5 exception is limited to state offi-
cials. Several factors support this limitation. First, it creates a clean, easy-
to-administer rule. Second, it reflects the structure and history of Section
5, which focused not merely on federal criminal prosecution, but
paradigmatically on federal criminal prosecution of state officials. 140 The
criminal provision of the Civil Rights Bill of 1866-the precursor of to-
day's Section 242-was aimed only at state officials. (As to private crimes
involving race and the like, cooperative federalism would enable good
faith states to prosecute private crimes themselves; and in bad faith states,
selective federal preemption and removal might well prove workable
when combined with the ability of the federal government to prosecute
any state official-like a governor with a too-quick pardon pen-who aids
private criminals or helps them escape state punishment.) Finally, many
of the arguments we have canvassed-about state self-dealing, the separa-
tion of powers (impeachment) analogy, the waiver claim, the unique and
awesome power wielded by government officials, and so on-apply only
or specially to state officials.
E. Summay: Reconstructing Dual Sovereignty
Let us now pause and take stock of the various dual sovereignty per-
mutations touched on by the preceding analysis.
Category one involves a federal prosecution following a trial for the
same offence in a foreign land. Even though two sovereigns are involved,
the clear English rule on which the Fifth Amendment Double Jeopardy
Clause was founded is dispositive here. If England would allow a French
137. The broad history of the Fourteenth Amendment-its backstop federalism
model and its special focus on federal criminal prosecution of abusive state officials-does
support our approach. See supra text accompanying notes 97-111, 114-118.
138. See Hoffman, supra note 60, at 660, 662 n.57, 669-70.
139. See Herman, supra note 20, at 637-39; see also Cassell, supra note 30, at 706-07
(discussing the expansive implications of Hoffman's proposal). Even with a broad federal
civil rights exception, dual sovereignty could still perhaps be abolished outside state-federal
prosecutions-e.g., in federal-state, state-state, and foreign-domestic prosecutions.
140. We do not claim that Section 5 focused exclusively on federal criminal
prosecution of state officials, only paradigmatically, see supra note 105. For our own
approach to race cases involving private defendants, see id.; see also infra Part III.
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judgment to bar retrial, so should America. 141 Category two involves the
reverse situation. A federal trial precedes a foreign one for the same of-
fence. Here, if a defendant is ultimately subject to two trials, it is only
because America's writ does not rule the globe: The United States can-
not compel other nations to respect our judgments, but America should
try-through international agreements and the like-to do what it can.
Categories three and four involve foreign-state and state-foreign
prosecutions respectively. And the results here should, post-incorpora-
tion, track those for categories one and two, respectively. After
Fourteenth Amendment incorporation, and the repudiation of Barton, a
state should generally be held to the same standard as the federal
government.
Category five, the state-state situation in Heath, is also easy. Heath was
wrongly decided, and should be overruled. If England would respect a
Georgia judgment, so should Alabama a fortiori. If Alabama must treat a
French judgment as preclusive (category three), it should, a fortiori, treat
a Georgiajudgment as preclusive. If, after incorporation, Georgia cannot
try Heath twice, and Alabama cannot try Heath twice, then together the
two governments should not try Heath twice.
All of these reasons likewise bar reprosecution in category six, when
a federal trial has ended and a state wants to reprosecute. It would be
odd if Alabama owed a federal judgment less respect than a Georgian one
(category five) or a foreign one (category three); and federal supremacy
affirmatively cuts against reprosecution. Nor is there any provision of our
Constitution that is the precise mirror image of Section 5 authorizing
state criminal prosecution of abusive federal officials in the teeth of ex-
plicit federal immunity.
142
Finally, we come once again to our last dual sovereignty category,
involving federal efforts to prosecute after a state prosecution. And here,
we have of course proposed a general ban on such retrial, subject to a
principled Section 5 exception for state officials.'
43
141. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text; see also United States v. Furlong,
18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 184, 197 (1820):
Robbery on the seas is considered as an offence within the criminal jurisdiction of
all nations. It is against all, and punished by all; and there can be no doubt that
the plea of autrefois acquit would be good in any civilized State, though resting on
a prosecution instituted in the Courts of any other civilized State.
142. For a reading of the Tenth Amendment as inviting state civil suits authorizing
compensatory damages against federal officials who violate the federal Constitution, see
Amar, supra note 58, at 1492-1520.
143. As we have seen, supra text accompanying note 98, states have much less power
to sabotage federal prosecutions in Fourth Amendment and self-incrimination contexts.
Nevertheless, doctrinal symmetry might argue for a Section 5 exception to both Elkins and
Murphy. An alternative approach would cure the sabotage problem by rethinking the
substantive and remedial contours of the Fourth Amendment and the Self-Incrimination
Clause. If the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule were abandoned in favor of civil
actions against the offending government, see Amar, supra note 74, at 811-16; and if only
compelled testimony, but not fruits, were immunized from introduction in criminal cases,
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II. WHAT IS THE "SAME OFFENCE"?
If the Supreme Court were to abandon the general dual sovereignty
doctrine, offences defined by different governments would not always be
different by definition. How would the Court decide whether two crimes
defined by different governments were indeed the "same offence"? Re-
cently the Court reestablished the Blockburger'" test as the primary stan-
dard for determining whether two offences within the same jurisdiction
are the same for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause.' 45 Yet if the
Court were to modify the dual sovereignty doctrine in any meaningful
way, it would need to adjust Blockburger as well. We shall explain why this
is so in section B below; but first we must consider Blockburger in some
detail and note some of its oddities wholly apart from dual sovereignty
concerns.
A. Greater, Lesser, and Same Offences
Blockburger requires a court to compare the language of the statutes
(or common-law crimes) at issue in successive prosecutions to determine
whether each includes an element that the other does not.146 Thus,
under this test, the phrase "same offence" encompasses more than identi-
cal provisions. If statute X requires an element or elements that statute Y
does not, these statutes will still be treated as describing the "same" of-
fence so long as X contains all of Ys elements-that is, so long as Y is a
"lesser included" offence.
One justification for treating these statutes as the same is that the
greater offence, X, typically carries a penalty that incorporates punish-
ment for the lesser included offence, Y.147 For example, armed robbery
contains the lesser included offence of robbery. Assume that armed rob-
bery carries a fifteen-year sentence and that robbery carries a five-year
sentence. The armed robbery penalty presumably includes the five years
for robbery and tacks on ten years for the use of a weapon. To convict an
armed robber of both armed robbery and simple robbery and to punish
him with twenty years (fifteen plus five) would presumably be double
counting. The Blockburger test is therefore most appropriate in the con-
text of double punishment: It prevents a defendant from being punished
separately for two offences where the legislature can be presumed to have
see Amar & Lettow, supra note 98, (manuscript at 48-55, on file with author), the
intersovereign sabotage problem would disappear in the contexts of search, seizure, and
self-incrimination.
144. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
145. See United States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849, 2860 (1993).
146. See Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304.
147. See Peter Westen & Richard Drubel, Toward a General Theory of Double
Jeopardy, 1978 Sup. Ct. Rev. 81, 157-59 (reasoning that rule of lenity requires




provided a penalty for the .greater offence that already includes punish-
ment for the lesser included offence.
148
Yet strictly speaking, double counting is not an issue unique to the
DoubleJeopardy Clause. Double counting is impermissible even if cumu-
lative punishment for robbery and armed robbery were imposed in a sin-
gle trial. Blockburger's core idea is a simple one rooted in the general rule
of law-judges may not impose greater punishment than the legislature
has authorizedl 49 -combined with a commonsensical presumption, bol-
stered by the Due Process Clause, that a legislature that intends to author-
ize double counting for lesser included offences must speak with special
clarity.' 50 The Court in the 1993 Dixon case, however, made clear that
the Blockburger test also governs successive prosecutions under the Double
Jeopardy Clause. 15'
Yet this result cannot be squared with the text of the Double Jeopardy Clause.
If we look solely to the elements of offences (as does Blockburger),152 a
greater offence X is plainly not the same as its lesser included offence Y.
By definition, X contains an element thatY does not; by definition, X and
148. The Court ruled in Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 366-67 (1983), that the
presumption against the creation of separate offences can be overcome by express
legislative intent, indicating that the test is one of statutory construction only. For
example, lower courts have ruled that the presumption does not hold for RICO violations.
Even though the predicate RICO offences (bribery, extortion, etc.) are lesser included
offences of a RICO violation, courts have held that Congress intended to create separate
penalties. See Karen J. Ciupak, Note, RICO and the Predicate Offenses: An Analysis of
Double Jeopardy and Verdict Consistency Problems, 58 Notre Dame L. Rev. 382, 391-93
(1982) (discussing United States v. Hartley, 678 F.2d 961 (11th Cir. 1982)). And the
Supreme Court has already taken a similar view of the federal "continuing criminal
enterprise" statute. See Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773 (1985).
When a logical greater offence carries a smaller penalty than its lesser included
offence, the presumption that the legislature intended to fold one sentence into the other
should clearly be inapplicable. United States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849 (1993), is one such
case, see infra text accompanying notes 164-165, 177-182. See also United States v. York,
888 F.2d 1050, 1058-59 (5th Cir. 1989). The York court found that Congress intended to
punish separately the crimes of lying on forms submitted to the government, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1001, and lying on forms specifically with intent to influence a financial institution, 18
U.S.C. § 1014. While 18 U.S.C. § 1001 was the logical lesser offence, it was the penal
greater offence. If the statutes were held under Blockburger to be the same offence for
purposes of punishment, 18 U.S.C. § 1014 would be rendered superfluous because it
carried a lesser sentence yet was more difficult to prove. The Blockburger presumption
therefore is only appropriate if the logical greater offence is also the penal greater offence.
If not, it is awkward to presume that the legislature considered the larger penalty for the
lesser when determining the smaller penalty for the greater offence.
149. Cf. U.S. Const. amend. VIII (prohibiting excessive punishment-planly
including punishment beyond that legislatively authorized).
150. For a similar view of the double counting issue, see Department of Revenue v.
Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1955-59 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
151. See Dixon, 113 S. Ct. at 2860.
152. For additional discussion of why we should focus on the legal elements of an




Y are different. 153 Surely if X is the "same" as Y and the "same" as Z, then
Y and Z must also be the "same"; yet Blockburger flunks even this elemen-
tary test of sameness. Under Blockburger, a greater offence with elements
(A) and (B) would be the "same" as lesser included offences (A) and (B),
respectively, but these lesser included offences would not be the "same"
as each other. So too, under Blockburger, a lesser offence (A) is the
"same" as greater offence (A+B) and the "same" as greater offence (A+C),
yet these greater offences are not the "same" as each other.
On the other hand, in order to enforce the principles underlying the
DoubleJeopardy Clause and its companion Due Process Clause-protect-
ing innocent persons and checking government overreaching 5 4 -
greater and lesser included offences, though not technically the same of-
fence, should typically not be prosecuted successively. To see this more
clearly, let us divide the universe of successive Blockburger prosecutions
into four logical subcategories.
1. Initial Acquittal of the Lesser Included Offence. - First, assume that
the government seeks to prosecute the defendant for armed robbery after
he was acquitted of robbery. Ashe v. Swenson' 55 provides the proper re-
sult. Ashe held that the Constitution protects a criminal defendant's right
to invoke the collateral estoppel principle. Under this general principle,
once an issue of ultimate fact has been resolved by a valid judgment, it
typically cannot be relitigated between the parties.' 5 6 After stating the
general principle, the Court of course made clear that collateral estoppel
protects the defendant only when the issue was decided in his favor: "For
whatever else that constitutional guarantee may embrace, . . . it surely
protects a man who has been acquitted from having to 'run the gantlet' a
second time."1 5 7 Consistent with Ashe, because our defendant was acquit-
153. The Supreme Court has already noted this point in passing, see Garrett v. United
States, 471 U.S. 773, 786 (1985), discussed infra text accompanying notes 186-191. Contra
Dixon, 113 S. Ct. at 2884 n.4 (SouterJ., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting
in part) ("The irrelevance of additional elements can be seen in the fact that.., the Double
Jeopardy Clause does provide protection not merely against prosecution a second time for
literally the same offense, but also against prosecution for greater offenses in which the
first crime was lesser-included .... " (emphasis added)).
154. These principles are derived from Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88
(1957), discussed supra at note 52 and accompanying text.
155. 397 U.S. 436 (1970). In Ashe, the state sought to prosecute the defendant for
robbery of a player in a poker game after he had been acquitted of robbing another player,
Donald Knight. Because witnesses at the first trial were unable to conclusively identify the
defendant, and because the judge instructed the jury to find the defendant guilty if it
found him to be one of the robbers (though not necessarily the robber of Knight), the
Court ruled that the issue of whether the defendant had been one of the robbers was
resolved in the defendant's favor and could not be relitigated. See id. at 437-39, 445.
156. See id. at 443.
157. Id. at 445-46 (emphasis added) (quoting Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184,
190 (1957)). The Court has never held that the prosecution can apply the same principle
to prevent the defendant from defending against a particular charge. Indeed, it has said
that prosecutors may not use the principle offensively. See id. at 443; Simpson v. Florida,
403 U.S. 384, 386 (1971).
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ted of robbing the victim, he cannot constitutionally be prosecuted for
armed robbery-an essential element of proof (robbery) was already re-
solved in the defendant's favor. This rule thus serves the Constitution's
dual purposes of protecting innocent citizens 158 and checking govern-
ment abuse.
Although the Ashe result is right, its reasoning is faulty. Ashe rooted
collateral estoppel in the Double Jeopardy Clause, but this is a mismatch.
The true source of the Ashe idea is due process, not double jeopardy.
Doublejeopardy is explicitly limited to retrials for the "same offence," but
the Ashe principle cannot be so limited. Even if we assume greater and
lesser included offences are somehow the "same," surely robbery and kid-
napping are different offences under Blockburger's test or any other. Yet if
ajudge acquitted a robbery defendant on the ground that the police had
nabbed the wrong man in a plain case of mistaken identity, surely Ashe
would bar retrial for kidnapping arising out of the same episode. 15 9 And
this proves that the Ashe idea must be rooted outside the strict text of the
Double Jeopardy Clause, in the more spacious-but also more flexible,
less absolute-language of due process. 160 (Of course, the spirit of the
Double Jeopardy Clause may help inform the more global due process
principle.'61 )
And so in this subcategory at least, we reach the same result as
Blockburger without having to claim that different offences are somehow
the same.
2. Initial Acquittal of the Greater Offence. - Now assume that the de-
fendant was acquitted of armed robbery and the government then seeks
to prosecute him for robbery. At the armed robbery trial both the de-
fense counsel and the prosecution would typically have had the right to
request that the fact finder be instructed on all lesser included offences-
158. If you play with something long enough, you are likely to break it; and if the
government is allowed to prosecute an innocent defendant enough times and disregard all
acquittals, eventually it is likely to convict an innocent (by hypothesis) person.
159. If a jury acquitted our defendant, the basis for its acquittal might be unclear,
submerged in a general verdict. For our suggestion to eliminate this uncertainty and help
defendants take full advantage of Ashe, see infra note 166.
160. Ashe resisted this idea because its double jeopardy theory enabled the Court to
sidestep an earlier case with virtually identical facts decided against the defendant under
the Due Process Clause, see Hoag v. NewJersey, 356 U.S. 464 (1958). But the Ashe Court
could have sidestepped Hoag simply by reinterpreting due process in light of later
developments, including the incorporation of the Double Jeopardy Clause in Benton v.
Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969). Ashe instead tried to rely more directly on Benton, insisting
that the Double Jeopardy Clause itself embodied collateral estoppel. See Ashe, 397 U.S. at
436, 442, 445.
161. For example, due process does not necessarily require that collateral estoppel
rules in civil cases track those in criminal cases. The gravitational pull of the Double
Jeopardy Clause is much weaker in civil cases; the dread, stigma, expense, and anxiety of
the citizen in a typical civil case are much lower than in a typical criminal case. Forcing a
person to run the gauntlet twice could thus be seen as less procedurally oppressive in civil
cases. Cf. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (due process requires proof beyond
reasonable doubt in criminal but not civil cases).
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e.g., robbery-that are supported by the evidence.' 62 As a matter of trial
strategy, however, each side may sometimes choose not to do so.163
Whenever the prosecutor can request a jury instruction on lesser in-
cluded offences, she should not be allowed to bring them as separate
charges in a later prosecution.
To cast the point into a precise textual argument under the Double
Jeopardy Clause, the prosecutor's power to seek a lesser included instruc-
tion means that defendant was in jeopardy at the first trial for all lesser
included offences. Whenever a prosecutor can request a lesser included
instruction, defendant's blanket acquittal is an implicit acquittal on each
lesser included offence; and a later trial on any lesser included charge
would put defendant twice in jeopardy for the same (lesser included) of-
fence. Thus, our defendant was indeed acquitted of robbery in his armed
robbery trial; and he may thus plead autrefois acquit to a subsequent rob-
bery charge. And so here, too, our approach generally converges with
Blockburger's result, but without the textual gymnastics.
Lest we be tempted to think that this result somehow suggests that
armed robbery and robbery are really the "same" and that Blockburger
might be right after all, consider armed robbery and bank robbery.
Clearly these are different offences under Blockburger-only the first re-
quires a weapon; only the second, a bank. Yet an acquittal on either
would implicitly be an acquittal on robbery, and would thus bar retrial on
the other, under the Ashe principle. But surely, this does not mean that
armed robbery equals bank robbery.
However, there are some rare situations where the prosecution in
the first case could not even request an instruction on logically lesser in-
cluded offences. Consider, for example, the Court's recent double jeop-
ardy case, United States v. Dixon.'6 When Dixon was prosecuted for crimi-
nal contempt for violating a court order not to commit other crimes
(here, a drug crime), he could not have been convicted for the logically
lesser included drug offence because he was prosecuted pursuant to a
special provision that allows contempt convictions after expedited pro-
ceedings without a jury.' 65 In this rare circumstance neither collateral
estoppel nor the Double Jeopardy Clause should always bar a second
prosecution for the lesser offence.
162. For the federal rule, see Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 717 & n.9
(1989) (construing Fed. R. Grim. P. 31(c)).
163. The recent Reginald Denny beating case illustrates such a tactic. Counsel for
Damian Williams requested that the jury consider only the count of attempted murder,
and not any lesser included counts. Nor did the prosecution seek an instruction on lesser
included offences. See Bernard Grofman, The Denny Beating Trial: Justice in the
Balance, Chi. Trib., Nov. 3, 1993, § 1, at 21.
164. 113 S. Ct. 2849 (1993).
165. See id. at 2853; see also In re Nielsen, 131 U.S. 176, 190 (1889) ("But where a
conviction for a less crime cannot be had under an indictment for a greater which includes
it,... an acquittal would not or might not be a bar....").
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To simplify things, let's assume that the basis for the verdict of ac-
quittal is clear (either because ajury or judge supplies it, or because it is
apparent from a review of the trial record).166 Under the Ashe principle
of due process collateral estoppel, the defendant cannot be prosecuted
for the lesser included offence if the prosecution failed to prove it as an
element of the greater offence; the risk of convicting an innocent defend-
ant is too high,167 and the government is not entitled to two bites at the
apple.
On the other hand, if a prosecutor cannot seek a lesser included
instruction at the first trial and if the acquittal on the greater charge
rested only on the prosecutor's failure to prove an element or elements
exclusive to the greater offence, then the Ashe collateral estoppel princi-
ple would not bar a second trial on other elements. Nor is due process
offended simply by two trials, if the government can point to a neutral,
nonvexatious reason for proceeding in two steps. And the Double
Jeopardy Clause, we submit, is not violated by two trials for different of-
fences. Thus in some atypical situations the defendant could be prose-
cuted for the lesser offence without violating the letter or spirit of either
due process or double jeopardy. In these rare cases, our result diverges
from Blockburger's-and, we think, makes more sense.
3. Initial Conviction of the Lesser Included Offence. - Next, consider the
defendant who is convicted of attempted murder and is then prosecuted
for murder. Although the Blockburger test treats attempted murder and
murder as the same offence for purposes of successive prosecution, the
Supreme Court, in a footnote in Brown v. Ohio,' 68 has already acknowl-
edged a possible exception to Blockburger "where the State is unable to
proceed on the more serious charge at the outset because the additional
facts necessary to sustain that charge have not occurred or have not been
discovered despite the exercise of due diligence."' 69 The Brown footnote
166. In Ashe, although the jury delivered a general verdict, it had been instructed to
find the defendant guilty if he was one of the robbers, even if he had not personally
robbed Knight, the victim whom the defendant at the first trial was accused of robbing.
See supra note 155. According to Ashe, in deciding the merits of a collateral estoppel
claim, a court must" 'examine the record of a prior proceeding, taking into account the
pleadings, evidence, charge, and other relevant matter.'" Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436,
444 (1970) (quoting Sealfon v. United States, 332 U.S. 575, 579 (1948)). We would suggest
that after an acquittal, defendant should be entitled to request a specific verdict from the
trier of fact as to which specific elements or facts were resolved in defendant's favor. Such
a special verdict would make Ashe much easier to administer, and would better protect
defendants against the risks of erroneous conviction and abusive prosecution. A
defendant of course would not be obliged to ask for such a special verdict; and ajury would
not be obliged-only empowered-to answer;, and so our proposal here would in no way
"nullify" whatever "nullification power" juries now have.
167. See supra note 158.
168. 432 U.S. 161 (1977) (holding that conviction for auto theft violates Double
Jeopardy Clause because defendant had already pled guilty tojoyriding, a lesser included
offence).
169. Id. at 169 n.7.
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is rooted in a venerable Supreme Court precedent from 1912,170 and
Justices in many other cases have repeated its caveat. 171 Indeed, as we
shall soon show, in one important but unappreciated case, the Court
made clear that the Brown footnote does indeed allow double prosecu-
tion of lesser included and greater offences in some important cases.
172
The Brown footnote should not mean that judges can simply carve
out ad hoc exceptions to clear textual rights-that courts can blithely
disregard the Double Jeopardy Clause and the plea of autrefois convict de
mhmefelonie. Rather, the Brown footnote should be read as intuiting that
greater and lesser included offences are not, strictly speaking, the same;
therefore, successive prosecution is sometimes allowable. This does not
mean that a prosecution for a greater offence following conviction for a
lesser included offence is automatically legitimate; here, too, we must
confront due process issues above and beyond the commands of the
Double Jeopardy Clause. Due process is broader, but more flexible.
173 It
extends to prosecutions for different offences, but does not categorically
bar two trials. Under this due process approach, the prosecutor may not
seek two trials merely to vex the defendant. Nor should she bifurcate
trials merely to get a cheat peek at defendant's strategy at a "preliminary
bout" in order to improve her odds at the second trial, the "main
event". 174 She could satisfy this due process standard by demonstrating
that she was unable to try the more serious murder charge at the first
prosecution because of belated (and not irresponsible) discovery of new
evidence or the occurrence of subsequent events-e.g., the death of the
victim after the first trial, from injuries proximately caused by
defendant.1 75
170. See Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442, 448-49 (1912).
171. See, e.g., United States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849, 2887 n.7 (1993) (Souter, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part); Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508,
516 n.7 (1990); Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 797 (1985) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring); id. at 803-04 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410, 420 n.8
(1980);Jeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137, 151-52 (1977); see also Ashe v. Swenson, 397
U.S. 436, 453 n.7 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring) (following Diaz).
Lower courts have also relied on the Brown exception to the Blockburger rule. See, e.g.,
United States v. Stearns, 707 F.2d 391, 393-94 (9th Cir. 1983) (applying exception to
permit second prosecution for felony murder after conviction for lesser offence where
government did not possess evidence necessary to sustain greater charge at outset despite
exercise of due diligence), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1047 (1984).
172. See Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773 (1985), discussed infra text
accompanying notes 186-191.
173. The aptness of a flexible due process analysis is in fact subtly signalled by the
Brown footnote, which speaks of "due diligence." See supra text accompanying note 169
(emphasis added).
174. We do not take any position on the precise contours of presumptions, prima
facie showings, burdens of going forward, and burdens of proof entailed by such a due
process approach. See infra note 184.
175. See Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 169 n.7 (1977). The asymmetric rules of
collateral estoppel, discussed earlier, also provide strong disincentives against strategic
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Underlying such an approach is the principle that the government
should be able to punish the defendant for the most culpable aspects of
his conduct, but not if the punishment is exacted in a manner that is
deliberately designed to harass the defendant. If the government later
secures conviction on the greater offence, then the defendant must be
credited for the time served or allotted for the lesser included offence
(in order to avoid double counting, per the original purpose of the
Blockburger rule) unless the legislature intended the offences to be pun-
ished separately.' 76
4. Initial Conviction of the Greater Offence. - Finally, consider the pros-
ecution of a defendant for attempted murder after he was convicted for
murder. Murder obviously carries a stiffer penalty than attempted mur-
der; and so the government prosecuting a defendant for attempted mur-
der after getting a conviction for murder would be hard-pressed to come
up with a justification for its action other than a desire to harass the de-
fendant. The greater penalty typically will subsume the lesser such that
no additional sentence can be meted out for the conviction on the lesser.
Thus, the initial conviction for the greater offence typically merges all
lesser included offences into the first verdict.
But the Dixon case provides an example of where the Blockburger test
goes awry. The Court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause barred
Dixon's prosecution for a drug offence because he had already been con-
victed of contempt of court.1 7 7 Contempt of court was the logical greater
offence because it required proof of knowledge of a court order (issued
pursuant to an unrelated charge) and proof of any offence prohibited by
the D.C. Code-the order prohibited defendant from violating any part
of the D.C. Code.178 The substantive charge, cocaine possession (an of-
fence prohibited under the D.C. Code), was a logical lesser included of-
fence of contempt, which also required knowledge of the court order.
Thus, the Court ruled that Blockburger prohibited subsequent prosecution
for cocaine possession.
Yet although the contempt offence was the greater logical offence, it
was the lesser penal offence. It carried a maximum prison sentence of six
months, 17 9 whereas the cocaine charge carried a maximum prison sen-
tence of thirty years.18 0 So here, unlike our murder/attempted murder
bifurcation by the prosecutor. If she wins the first bout, she must prove everything again at
the second trial; but if she loses, she is forever barred from bringing the second case.
176. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
177. See United States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849, 2858 (1993).
178. The release order's incorporation by reference of the entire D.C. criminal code
presents what we will call a "disjunctive elements" problem that need not be explained for
purposes of this discussion but will be treated infra notes 227-232 and accompanying text.
179. See Dixon, 113 S. Ct. at 2853.
180. See D.C. Code Ann. § 33-541(2) (A) (1981). Defendant Foster's prosecution
presented the same problem. He was first convicted of criminal contempt based on proof
that he committed two assaults. See Dixon, 113 S. Ct. at 2854. The Court found that under
Blockburger a second trial for assault was barred because assault, though it carried a stiffer
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hypothetical, we can see why the government had a legitimate reason for
pursuing a so-called "lesser" prosecution after securing a conviction on
the so-called "greater" offence. The government should not be denied
the opportunity to punish the defendant to the fullest extent of his culpa-
bility-to try Dixon on the thirty-year drug charge and notjust the trivial
contempt charge. As a matter of common sense and plain meaning, it is
hard to see how contempt of court and cocaine possession are the "same
offence" under the Double Jeopardy Clause. 181 And due process allows a
second trial so long as the government can show that it had a legitimate
nonvexatious reason to try the charges separately.' 8 2
5. Beyond Blockburger. - In the end, Blockburger ordinarily reaches
the right result-but not always. And even where Blockburger gets it right,
it gives the wrong reason, insisting that day is night and that different
offences are really the same.
To reach the right results for the right reasons, we have proposed
three simple rules: (1) the Double JeopardyClause means what it says-
"same" means "same";' 83 (2) the Due Process Clause generally gives a
criminal defendant who prevails on any issue a right to collaterally estop
the government from relitigating that issue; (3) the Due Process Clause
also counsels that even where two different offences are involved, the gov-
ernment must have good, nonvexatious reasons for prosecuting these of-
fences in two separate trials rather than one.'
8 4
penalty than criminal contempt, was the logical lesser included offence of criminal
contempt. See id. at 2858.
181. And of course it is also hard to see how a six-month crime is "greater" than a
thirty-year crime.
182. The government likely could have satisfied this burden in Dixon because the
criminal contempt statute permitted convictions after expedited proceedings without a
jury. See Dixon, 113 S. Ct. at 2853-54. Whether Blockburger would require a punishment
setoff after the second conviction to avoid double counting depends on legislative intent.
As we suggested, supra note 148, where the logical greater offence is the lesser penal
offence, the presumption against double counting is inapt.
183. An offence must of course be the same in fact as well as law. Two burglaries,
committed on two days, might involve the same law and the same elements, but different
facts: the defendant violated the same law twice. At times, nice "unit of prosecution" issues
arise: Is an ongoing course of conduct one offence or several? Can a single theft of $500
be seen as five thefts of $100? But these are ultimately issues of statutory construction and
legislative intent, see Westen & Drubel, supra note 147, at 111-22.
184. Note how the second rule creates strong incentives that help implement the
mandate of the third rule, see supra note 175. Note also how our second rule is a due
process cousin of autrefois acquit, protecting defendants who win in their first trial, whereas
our third rule-like autrefois convict-protects even defendants who lose their first trial.
(Our earlier rule against double counting in punishment, see supra text accompanying
notes 148-150, is yet another due process cousin of autrfois convict.)
Note finally how the adequacy of reasons the government might offer to meet the
third rule will often depend on the precise degree of factual and logical proximity between
offences. And this is once again evidence that the principle is one of flexible due process,
rather than categorical double jeopardy. In some ways, Justice Brennan's famous
suggestion that the government must prosecute all crimes arising out of a single
"transaction" in one shot is a broad application of our third principle. See Ashe v.
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Taken together, these three principles explain almost all of what the
Court has done under Blockburger;, but where our rules and Blockburger
diverge-the Brown footnote and Dixon, for example-our approach is
better as a matter of text, logic, and common sense. Our principles also
have one happy side effect. By moving some issues out of double jeop-
ardy and into due process, they can help courts craft rules that place spe-
cial emphasis on protecting innocent defendants.' 85 The formal rules of
double jeopardy require symmetry between autrefois acquit and autrefois
convict-between those defendants who have been proved innocent, and
those proved guilty in (presumptively) fair trials. The more flexible norm
of due process need not demand strict symmetry, and may enable judges
to craft stronger rules protecting acquitted defendants.
Although our analytic assault on Blockburger might seem idiosyncratic
and our fist-pounding insistence that "same" means "same" might look
naive, we would invite skeptics to read with care an important but often
overlooked 1985 case, Garrett v. United States.186 In Garrett the Supreme
Court upheld a prosecution for a greater offence-a federal "continuing
criminal enterprise" (CCE) charge-after defendant had already been
convicted of a predicate, lesser included drug charge.' 8 7 This result
plainly violated a strict application of Blockburger, but the Court instead
followed the logic of the Brown footnote.18 s Even more important than
what the Court did is what the Court said in Garrett: "Quite obviously the
CCE offense is not, in any common-sense or literal meaning of the term,
the 'same' offense as one of the [lesser included] predicate offenses." 189
Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 453-54 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring). But Justice Brennan
frames his rule categorically, perhaps because he claims it is a principle of double jeopardy
rather than due process. In this claim, he errs. Kidnapping is not the "same offence" as
rape, even if both arise out of the same "transaction." The Double Jeopardy Clause is
categorical precisely because it is narrow, almost mathematical. "Same" equals "same," and
"offences" are defined by common law and statutes, see infra text accompanying notes
192-193, 199-205. By contrast, there is no Platonic essence called a "transaction." A
categorical rule might nevertheless be justified, but it must be defended as a mandate of
due process, not doublejeopardy. Thus, the Due Process Clause is compatible with a wide
range of anti-vexation rules, from a narrow set focusing only on malicious prosecutorial
intent, to a broader set focusing on the harmful effect of two trials on a defendant,
triggering a governmental duty to consolidate trials wherever possible. So too, a due
process approach is compatible with a wide range of implementing rules concerning
burdens of proof and so on-from broad rules presuming vexation in certain unexplained
reprosecutions to narrow rules placing the burden of proof on defendants to make out a
prima facie case of bad faith before obtaining discovery on the issue. (On this last point,
we are indebted to Paul G. Cassell.)
185. See, e.g., supra note 158.
186. 471 U.S. 773 (1985).
187. Id. at 793-95; see also Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493 (1984) (allowing
prosecution for murder afterjudge accepted defendant's guilty plea, over state's objection,
to lesser included charge of involuntary manslaughter).
188. See Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 169 n.7 (1977), discussed supra text
accompanying notes 168-175.
189. Garrett, 471 U.S. at 786.
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Though it went virtually unnoticed in Dixon, Garrett seems inconsis-
tent with that 1993 case in language and result. For those, like Justice
Souter, who particularly value precedent, it should be noted that Garrett
was an opinion of the Court authored by now Chief Justice Rehnquist,
whereas in Dixon no opinion commanded a majority on how Blockburger
should be understood. 190 For those, like Justice Scalia, who place a pre-
mium on "common sense" and "literal meaning," it should, upon further
reflection, seem preposterous that cocaine possession is the "same of-
fence" as contempt of court. 19 1 Dixon was a windfall to the guilty, sup-
ported by neither the text of the Double Jeopardy Clause nor the com-
mon sense underlying due process.
B. Same Words or Same Things?: Blockburger in a Cross-Sovereign Setting
Blockburger's test has other flaws that become apparent in cross-sover-
eign contexts. The Court has never confronted these problems because
of its rigid adherence to the dual sovereignty doctrine, which obviates the
need to resort to a substantive "same offence" test such as Blockburger. It is
precisely because Blockburger is designed to determine a single legisla-
ture's output that it does not, in its current form, readily apply across
jurisdictions.
Let us begin by focusing on what Blockburger does right. Though it
misses the plain meaning of the word "same" it does focus squarely on the
next word: "offence." As we have seen, a court applying Blockburger looks
at the language of two statutes, (or common-law crimes), parses the ele-
ments of each offence, and asks whether one set of elements is a lesser
included set of the other. Blockburger's focus on legal elements rather
than conduct accords with the text of the Double Jeopardy Clause, which
190. Though Garrett did not purport to overrule Brown, 432 U.S. 161, its holding is in
some tension with Brown, where the Court prohibited Ohio from trying the defendant on
the greater offence of auto theft after convicting him of the lesser included offence of
joyriding. The state's reasons for two trials did not seem particularly malicious, but
sounded in local autonomy: the police in one county, where defendant was caught,
apparently did not know of the plans of the prosecutor from another county, where
defendant had stolen the car nine days earlier. Under an intent-based due process
analysis, the state's actions might pass muster as nonvexatious; but under a stricter effects-
based due process test, the fact that a highly organized state could have brought a single
case might be enough for Brown to win. But if Brown is right, it is only because of due
process rather than the Double Jeopardy Clause, strictly speaking. As a Double Jeopardy
Clause case, the logic of Brown cannot survive Garrett-or, indeed, the logic of its own
footnote 7 discussed supra notes 168-175 and accompanying text.
191. Sir William Blackstone, in a key passage quoted by Justice Scalia, insisted that
double jeopardy pleas were valid only for "the same identical act and crime." 4 William
Blackstone, Commentaries *336, quoted in Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 530 (1990)
(Scalia, J., dissenting). Blackstone's immediately preceding sentence, in which he stated
that a manslaughter conviction would bar a murder prosecution, also anticipated
Blockburger, whose results, as we have seen, generally track ours, save in rare cases. Several
other historical sources quoted by Scalia in Grady also support our approach. See Grady,
495 U.S. at 530-35.
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speaks of the same "offence"-commonly understood in 1791 to mean a
violation of a law.192 And this focus on legal elements finds strong sup-
port in early case law and commentary. 93 Blockburger's approach is also
easy to administer, in dramatic contrast to a focus on conduct. Statute
books and common-law decisions contain discrete units-distinct of-
fences like murder, mayhem, etc.-but in the real world no natural unit
of conduct exists.
But in dual sovereign situations, instead of having to assess the law of
a single legislature, a court must examine the laws of two legislatures vis-a-
vis each other. Because different legislatures often do not work from the
same linguistic building blocks, they will not use uniform language to
describe an offence, even when each is indeed outlawing the same crime
with the same elements-the "same offence" within the meaning of the
Double Jeopardy Clause. Blockburger therefore will offer minimal protec-
tion to defendants prosecuted in multiple jurisdictions if different statu-
tory language will automatically lead courts to say that separate offences
were created.
194
Consider, for example, the offence of second degree murder. In
Florida, second degree murder is defined as "the unlawful killing of a
human being, when perpetrated by any act imminently dangerous to an-
other and evincing a depraved mind regardless of human life .... , 195 In
California, murder is the unlawful killing of a human being "with malice
aforethought."196 Malice is further defined as "express" when there is a
"deliberate intention unlawfully to take away the life of a fellow creature"
and as "implied" when "no considerable provocation appears, or when
the circumstances attending the killing show an abandoned and malig-
nant heart."197
Although each state appears to define the same crime-a form of
murder that is neither premeditated nor committed during the perpetra-
tion of another felony-the states use different language. An unvar-
nished Blockburger test might permit separate prosecutions or multiple
punishments under these statutes because one of California's "elements"
of murder is "an abandoned and malignant heart" or "no considerable
192. See Grady, 495 U.S. at 529 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
193. See id. at 530-35; see also 3 Edward Coke, Institutes of the Laws of England 213
(London, Clarke 1809) ("[A]uterfoitz acquite must be of the same felony .... ."); 2 Matthew
Hale, The History of the Pleas of the Crown 243 (London, Payne 1778) (using "same
felony" and "same offence" interchangeably). A focus on the conduct proved at the first
trial would have been especially odd in light of the primitive state of earlyjudicial record-
keeping, in which only the ultimate verdict of acquittal or conviction might be recorded.
Even today, it is often hard to establish what was truly "proved" at the first trial, see supra
note 166.
194. Perhaps this is too harsh a reading of Blodkburger, as currenty understood. But
see infra note 198.
195. Fla. Stat. § 782.04(2) (1992).
196. Cal. Penal Code § 187(a) (1988).
197. Id. § 188.
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provocation," whereas Florida's "element" is "a depraved mind regardless
of human life." Different words apparently trigger a finding of different
"elements" under Blockburger.198
As this example illustrates, even if the Court abandoned the dual
sovereignty doctrine, the doctrine's definitional rule that two govern-
ments always create separate offences might resurface under the guise of
Blockburger. In most cross-sovereign cases the Blockburger inquiry might be
nothing more than a hollow exercise. Surely a defendant's rights should
not depend on the fortuity of two governments adopting the Model Penal
Code. To provide ordinary citizens real protection from successive prose-
cution by dual sovereigns, we must do more than abandon the general
dual sovereignty doctrine; we must further adjust the traditional
Blockburger approach. To find the right adjustments, we shall examine
the Supreme Court's recent debates over Blockburger, a key nineteenth
century Supreme Court case at the heart of these recent debates, and
English case law wrestling with the "same offence" problem in an inter-
sovereign setting. From these different sources, we shall propose a func-
tional test capable of vindicating the goals of the DoubleJeopardy Clause
in a cross-sovereign context.
1. The Blockburger Debate. - Interestingly, the Court's recent de-
bates over Blockburger help to point the way to a solution. In United States
v. Dixon,199 a majority of the Court agreed to overrule Grady v. Corbin,200
which established a "same conduct" test that made it far more difficult for
the government to bring successive prosecutions: "[T]he Double
Jeopardy Clause bars any subsequent prosecution in which the govern-
ment, to establish an essential element of an offence charged in that pros-
ecution, will prove conduct that constitutes an offence for which the de-
fendant has already been prosecuted."201 Led by Justice Scalia, dissenters
in Grady properly insisted that the Clause speaks of the same "offence"-
the same legally-defined crime-rather than the same conduct.20 2 The
Grady dissenters also rightly complained that the "same conduct" test
would be unworkable and would frustrate the Double Jeopardy Clause's
clear rule, designed to prevent a defendant from having to stand trial
twice. A plea of autrefois acquit or autrefois convict should be entered at the
outset of a second trial;20 3 yet the Grady majority's test would require a
198. See Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 336 (1981) ("[O]ur starting point
[when applying Blockburger must be the language of the statutes. Absent a 'clearly
expressed legislative intention to the contrary, that language must ordinarily be regarded
as conclusive.'") (quoting Consumers Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S.
102, 108 (1980)).
199. 113 S. Ct. 2849 (1993).
200. 495 U.S. 508 (1990).
201. Id. at 521.
202. See id. at 526. Though unmentioned in Grady, the Court's opinion in Schmuck
v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 719 (1989), strongly supported the dissenters' view that
"offence" focuses on the elements of a crime, not the conduct of a defendant.
203. See Grady, 495 U.S. at 539, 541-42 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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judge to wait until the second trial was well underway before being able to
determine properly whether the prosecution "prove [d] conduct that con-
stitutes an offence for which the defendant [was] ... already... prose-
cuted."20 4 After Grady came down, lower courts confirmed the dissenters'
concern about the administrability of the majority's same conduct test.20 5
Justice Scalia cited the confusion Grady generated as a justification
for overruling itjust three years later in Dixon.2 0 6 He also stated that the
Grady same conduct test lacked "constitutional roots," 20 7 whereas the
Blockburger test had the proper constitutional pedigree.20 8 Among other
cases, Justice Scalia discussed In re Nielsen,2 0 9 a nineteenth century deci-
sion that was oddly absent from his dissent in Grady, where he made the
same argument about precedential support for Blockburger. Yet Justice
Scalia's attempt to characterize Nielsen as a strict application of Blockburger
is awkward, as Justice Souter argued in dissent in Dixon. But contrary to
Justice Souter's suggestion, Nielsen does not provide direct support for
Grady's same conduct test either. Rather, Nielsen hints at an approach,
albeit not well articulated, that stands as a middle ground between
Justices Scalia and Souter. If sorted out, this approach would serve well
the purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause even when applied across
jurisdictions.
2. The Nielsen Model. - In Nielsen the defendant contended that his
trial for the crime of adultery after an earlier conviction for unlawful co-
habitation violated the Double Jeopardy Clause.2 10 The first indictment
charged that Nielsen had cohabited with two women as his wives and the
second indictment charged that Nielsen committed adultery with one of
these women.2 1 ' The Court, in a serpentine opinion, held for Nielsen,
204. Id. at 541.
205. See United States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849, 2864 & n.16 (1993); see also United
States v. Sanchez, 992 F.2d 1143, 1154 (11th Cir. 1993) ("Determining ex post whether the
'same conduct' was prosecuted in two proceedings can be a delicate task."), cert. denied,
114 S. Ct. 1051 (1994); Sharpton v. Turner, 964 F.2d 1284, 1287 (2d Cir. 1992) ("That
formulation [Grady] has proven difficult to apply ... "), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 494 (1993);
Ladner v. Smith, 941 F.2d 356, 364 (5th Cir. 1991) ("Grady is new and its lesson, even if
carefully analyzed and painstakingly administered, is not easy to apply."), cert. denied, 112
S. Ct. 1665 (1992); United States v. Calderone, 917 F.2d 717 (2d Cir. 1990) (each of three
judges interprets Grady's requirements differently), cert. granted and judgment vacated,
112 S. Ct. 1657. Judge Newman in his Calderone concurrence raised questions as to the
meaning of the Grady test. He noted that it was unclear what the Court meant by the word
"element," that is, whether the conduct previously prosecuted had to establish the entirety
of an element of the offence (to invalidate the second prosecution) or whether it only
needed to serve as evidence of an element. See id. at 723-26. He also found it unclear
whether the conduct proved at the second trial had to constitute the entirety of the offence
previously prosecuted or simply an element of the offence. See id. at 724.
206. See Dixon, 113 S. Ct. at 2863-64.
207. Id. at 2860.
208. See id. at 2860-62.
209. 131 U.S. 176 (1889).
210. See id. at 177-78.
211. See id. at 177.
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concluding that adultery was subsumed within unlawful cohabitation. An
element of adultery, marriage, though not explicitly an element of unlaw-
ful cohabitation, could be considered included within unlawful cohabita-
tion since the statute "is construed by this court as requiring... that the
parties should live together as-husband and wives."212 The Court also
construed the cohabitation statute to hold that sexual intercourse, an-
other element of adultery, was likewise necessarily included within unlaw-
ful cohabitation. 215 In this way the Court was able to shoehorn the case
into the "familiar" rule that "'[a] n acquittal or conviction for a greater
offence is a bar to a subsequent indictment for a minor offence included
in the former, wherever, under the indictment for the greater offence,
the defendant could have been convicted of the less .. . "214
Although Nielsen thus purported to apply a Blockburger-like test, a
stingy application of Blockburger would have led to a different result in
Nielsen. The cohabitation statute explicitly required proof of one ele-
ment-that a man was living with more than one woman-that the adul-
tery statute did not. And the adultery statute explicitly required proof of
an element-that either the man or woman was married-that the co-
habitation statute did not. 21 5 The Nielsen Court rejected this hyper-literal
approach, however, by looking beyond what the statutes by their letter
required for conviction. Although the unlawful cohabitation statute ex-
plicitly proscribed only "living together with more than one woman," the
Court extrapolated from the language a requirement of proof of living
together as "husband and wives," which served as a proxy for proof of
both marriage and sexual intercourse-unlike fornication, cohabitation
in effect required marriage. 21 6 By this method of statutory interpreta-
tion, adultery became a lesser included offence of unlawful
cohabitation.
217
Justice Souter in his Dixon dissent contended that Nielsen established
the rule that a subsequent prosecution is barred "for any charge compris-
ing an act that has been the subject of prior conviction."218 He believed
that Nielsen eschewed the technical Blockburger practice of examining the
statutory elements of the offences in favor of looking at the conduct or
act at issue. Justice Souter was half-right: The Nielsen Court's parsing of
the statutory elements of unlawful cohabitation suggests that the Court
212. Id. at 189.
213. See id. at 187.
214. Id. at 189 (quoting 1 Wharton's Treatise on Criminal Law § 560). See supra Part
II.A for discussion of how the Blockburger test expands application of this rule beyond what
the Double Jeopardy Clause requires. In fact, Nielsen contains important language
supporting our earlier critique of Blockburger, see id. at 190, quoted supra note 165. Note
also how the quote at hand supports our analysis in its "wherever" clause.
215. See Nielsen, 131 U.S. at 176-77.
216. See id. at 187.
217. See id. at 189.
218. United States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849, 2886 (1993) (Souter, J., concurring in
the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis added).
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was guided by a sense of fairness to the defendant, rather than by a
mechanical and hyper-literalistic version of the Blockburger test. Yet
Justice Souter, it seems, was also half-wrong: Nielsen did not apply the
Grady test, and the Court did not consider what conduct the prosecution
actually proved at trial. In fact, the Court did not look beyond the stat-
utes; it simply construed them to require certain elements that were not
apparent from a literal reading.
Though tortuous, Nielsen's look behind the literal meaning of the
words in the statutes offers a paradigm for dual sovereign successive pros-
ecutions. Within a single jurisdiction, perhaps different statutory lan-
guage is strong, though rebuttable, evidence that the legislature did in-
deed intend to create different offences. But this presumption is far less
sensible in a dual sovereign context.
3. The English Model. - As we saw in Part I, the modem American
dual sovereignty approach is at odds with the longstanding English com-
mon-law doctrine that "an acquittal or conviction by a court of competent
jurisdiction abroad is a bar to a prosecution for the same offense."
2 1 9
Over three hundred years ago the King's Bench ruled that a defendant
who had been acquitted for the killing of a Mr. Colson in Portugal could
not be tried again for that offence in England.2 2 0 A century later
England reaffirmed this principle in The King v. Roche221 by ruling that
Captain Roche could not be tried again for the murder ofJohn Ferguson
at the Cape of Good Hope if he had previously been acquitted of the
murder by the Supreme Court of CriminalJurisprudence in South Africa.
And Hutchinson and Roche are still good law today. As we have noted
above,2 22 England today pays more respect to a Georgia conviction than
does Alabama.
Recent English cases demonstrate that a workable "same offence"
test can be developed to decide double jeopardy issues across jurisdic-
tions. England's "same offence" test appears to fall somewhere between a
literalistic "same words" test and the far more open-ended same conduct
test-in fact, it is strikingly similar to the Nielsen analysis.
Consider, for example, the recent decision in R. v. Lavercombe,
223
where the English Court of Criminal Appeals rejected the defendants'
plea of autrefois convict in a Thailand court. The Court's approach mir-
rored Nielsen insofar as it looked beyond the literal terms of the statutes
to determine whether what appeared to be different offences were "in
effect" the same without collapsing into a Grady-like same conduct analy-
219. Grant, British Empire Comparisons, supra note 21, at 8.
220. R v. Hutchinson was not reported, but is referred to in several other cases. See
The King v. Roche, 168 Eng. Rep. 169, 169 n.(a) (1775); Beak v. Thyrwhit, 87 Eng. Rep.
124, 125 (1689). For a thorough discussion of the English cases, see Grant, Successive
Prosecutions, supra note 21, at 1318-31.
221. 168 Eng. Rep. 169 (1775).
222. See supra text accompanying notes 29-32.
223. 1988 Crim. L.R. 435 (CA. March 7, 1988) (LEXIS, Enggen Library, Cases File).
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sis. The key test was not whether the two statutes had the same words, but
whether they featured the same "essential ingredients."224 This test pre-
vents unfairness to defendants caused by overemphasis on happenstance
of phraseology. It also forecloses complex inquiries into what conduct
was proved at each trial and preserves each government's ability to pro-
tect different interests by establishing different elements for different of-
fences. The English test can thus also serve as a model.
4. A Functional (Same Real Elements) Test. - In order to give sub-
stance to a "same offence" test applied across jurisdictions, a "same real
elements" test should be established. Unlike the Grady approach, this
same real elements test would look only to statutes, borrowing from
Blockburger's strengths of simplicity, administrability, textual rootedness,
and historical pedigree. 225 But the same real elements test would go be-
yond a literalistic application of Blockburger by requiring a more probing
consideration of what element or elements the language in the statute is
actually describing. It would demand that judges give content to the ab-
stract language often employed in criminal statutes. This test would not
presume legislative intent to create separate offences merely because dif-
ferent words are used. Rather, it would seek to discern whether in fact
the statutes substantively describe the same offence with the same real
elements. For example, the Florida and California murder statutes 22 6
might be construed to describe the same offence because each statute
outlaws a kind of killing that does not involve premeditation or the com-
mission of an additional felony, but that is actuated by evil intent and is
not mitigated by external circumstances. The Florida statute called this
depraved mind murder; the California statute, abandoned heart murder.
But are not these phrases functionally synonymous? Are not both statutes
using different metaphoric language to describe the same offence with
the same real elements?
C. Rodney King Revisited
1. The Functional Test Applied. - Although the federal prosecution of
the Los Angeles police officers fits into the Section 5 exception elabo-
rated above, we will apply our proposed "same real elements" test to the
trial to illustrate how the test could apply to successive prosecutions
by dual sovereigns. But before we proceed, we must explore a final
Blockburger wrinkle raised by a "disjunctive elements" statute. The disjunc-
tive elements problem arises when one statute under which the defend-
ant is charged can be satisfied by a number of alternative elements and
the other statute includes one of those elements. Take the example of
felony murder. A felony murder statute requires proof of a killing (A)
during the commission of a felony, such as rape (B), arson (C), or armed
224. Id.
225. See supra text accompanying notes 192-193, 201-208.
226. See supra text accompanying notes 195-197.
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robbery (D). Rape (B) is not necessarily a lesser included offence of fel-
ony murder, which could be established by (A) + (C) or (A) +(D). But if
the indictment for felony murder lists rape as the predicate offence, rape
(B) is in effect the lesser included offence of felony murder, (A) + (B).
The fact that a legislature has adopted a single felony murder statute,
rather than three separate statutes-rape murder, arson murder, and
armed robbery murder-should presumably make no difference. And
since rape would be a lesser included offence within rape murder, pre-
sumably it should also be so with a felony murder prosecution where rape
is the predicate felony. This is the logic behind Harris v. Oklahoma.227
Let us now turn to the dual trials of the Los Angeles police officers.
The state charged the defendants under a statute prohibiting the use of
unnecessary force by a public officer.228 The federal government
charged the officers with violating 18 U.S.C. § 242,229 which prohibits
willfully depriving an individual of his constitutional or other federal
rights.
23 0
The first step in the test is to determine the appropriate statutory
language to compare. Because the federal statute references the
Constitution and the laws of the United States, the language from the
Constitution and the U.S. Code should be read into the federal statute.
Section 242 requires proof that the defendants willfully deprived a person
of any one constitutional or federal statutory right.23' But, consistent
with Harfis's teaching regarding such disjunctive elements, only the appli-
cable alternative elements (the predicate offences) should be considered;
it presumably should make no difference that Congress enacted a single
227. 433 U.S. 682 (1977). The Harris logic was elaborated and reaffirmed in Whalen
v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 694 (1980). In Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624 (1991), the
Court made clear that not all uses of the word 'or" in a statute should lead to a finding of
disjunctive elements. Sometimes, a single element can be proved in a number of alternate
ways, and ajury need not be unanimous as to which alternative occurred, so long as they
are unanimous that at least one did. See id. at 631-32. Schad thus confirms that the
Ha-is-Whalen rule-like the Blockburger rule-is merely a presumption that can be
rebutted by clear legislative intent to the contrary.
228. See Cal. Penal Code § 149 (1988). Section 149 provides: "Every public officer
who, under color of authority, without lawful necessity, assaults or beats any person is
punishable by a fine not exceeding ten thousand dollars, or by imprisonment in the state
prison, or in a county jail .... "
The state also charged all four police officers with assault, two with filing false reports,
and one with being an accessory after the fact. See Powell v. Superior Ct., 283 Cal. Rptr.
777, 779 (Ct. App. 1991). For purposes of simplicity in this example, we will consider only
§ 149.
229. See United States v. Koon, 833 F. Supp. 769, 774 (C.D. Cal. 1993), aff'd in part,
vacated in part, 34 F.3d 1416 (1994).
230. Section 242 provides, in relevant part: "Whoever, under color of any law, statute,
ordinance, regulation, or custom, willfully subjects any inhabitant of any State... to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the
Constitution or laws of the United States... shall be fined.., or imprisoned .... " 18




global statute, rather than a series of statutes for willful deprivation of
Free Speech, of Free Press, of the right against unreasonable seizures,
and so on. To find the predicate offences, we look at the indictment.
The federal prosecutors charged that the police officers acted to deprive
Rodney King of his Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable
searches and seizures.
232
The next step is to compare the appropriate provisions. The federal
statute expressly requires a willful state of mind and thus an intent to
perform the prohibited acts, while the state statute prohibiting an unnec-
essary assault or beating does not. In other words, under the federal stat-
ute, the officers could claim as a defense that they believed the bodily
seizure they effected was not unreasonable. The same claim would not be
a defense under the state statute-if the jury concluded that the beating
was unnecessary, the officers could be convicted despite their belief in its
necessity.
Conversely, the state statute includes as an element an unnecessary
assault or beating which the federal statute does not. An unreasonable
seizure (the federal predicate offence) does not necessarily involve an
unnecessary assault or beating. For example, a seizure might be constitu-
tionally unreasonable only because it is perpetrated without explicit de-
partment authorization or because it is excessive even if nonassaultive, or
because it is impermissibly motivated, or for any number of reasons.
Thus, both the state and federal statutes require proof of a fact that the
other does not. Even under a Blockburger approach equating greater and
lesser included offences, the two statutes here are therefore different,
with different real elements; and of course, this is so a fortiori under our
"same means same" approach, which treats even greater and lesser in-
cluded offences as different.
Even without the dual sovereignty doctrine, the second prosecution
in the Rodney King affair thus passes double jeopardy muster, for it truly
did focus on an analytically different offence, with different real ele-
ments. The two statutes involved not just different words, but different
things.
2. Beyond Double Jeopardy. - As we have seen, proper analysis must
range beyond the strict rule of the Double Jeopardy Clause. We must
also test the police officers' second trial against the general commands of
due process.
a. Collateral Estoppel. - To begin, let us recall that due process en-
compasses a collateral estoppel component: where a criminal defendant
has prevailed on a point against the government, the government is ordi-
narily estopped from relitigating that point. The King defendants would
232. The alleged Fourth Amendment offence implicated Officers Powell, Briseno,
and Wind. See Koon, 833 F. Supp. at 774. The indictment also alleged a general
Fourteenth Amendment due process violation implicating Sergeant Koon. See id. In light
of our analysis below that even the Fourth Amendment offence was different from the state
law crime, it follows a fortiori that the due process offence was also different.
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obviously try to bring themselves under this principle, but two big stum-
bling blocks stand in the way.
First, because the Simi Valley jury returned only a general verdict of
not guilty, it is impossible to identify the element or elements on which
defendants prevailed.23 3 Perhaps the key victory was on an element ex-
clusive to the state offence. If so, this victory would not bar a second trial
on the different elements of the federal offence. Perhaps, for example,
the firstjury found the brutal beating of King "necessary" for self-defense
and thus permissible; but the second jury decided that above and beyond
the necessity of the beating the overall episode (the "seizure") was consti-
tutionally unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-a violation of
department procedures, arbitrary, capricious, malicious, taunting, de-
grading, racist,234 or what have you.
Second, how can the federal government be estopped by a factual
issue resolved against a state government? Ordinarily, estoppel is not so
much a right or privilege of the winning party as a disability of the losing
party. If A prevails on a point in a litigation against B, A ordinarily can-
not estop C; but B may sometimes be estopped against D.235 Of course,
at precisely this point it looks as if we have, in one important pocket of
law, resurrected a kind of dual sovereignty idea-but one rooted in the
much more general principles and purposes of estoppel law, applying to
all parties, public ("sovereign") and private.
If we somehow switched from a "disability" perspective on estoppel
to a "privilege" perspective, however, the general principles of our earlier
dual sovereignty analysis would come into play. Perhaps, in an age of
cooperative federalism, a state government could be bound by the litiga-
tion disabilities of the federal government, and vice versa-where ordi-
nary citizens are involved and governments presumably work together in
law enforcement. But not in a case involving Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment and state officials. Surely, we cannot allow a state to white-
wash the wrongdoing of its own officials by prosecuting them in pattycake
trials, excluding all damning evidence, procuring findings of fact in de-
fendants' favor, and then insisting that these findings collaterally estop
federal criminal prosecution under Section 5.
b. Vexatious Harassment. - Finally, consider the due process princi-
ple that even where different offences are at stake, government must jus-
tify its decision to prosecute the offences separately rather than to-
gether.23 6 In the Los Angeles police affair, federalism itself provides a
neutral, nonvexatious reason for two trials. Even though the state and
233. For our concrete suggestion on how to make collateral estoppel a workable
instrument in a world of general verdicts, see supra note 166.
234. King did not testify at the state trial, but he did at the federal, claiming that the
police called him "killer" and taunted him, "we're going to kill you nigger, run." See
Levenson, supra note 120, at 531 n.121.
235. See Fleming James, Jr. et al., Civil Procedure 617-28 (4th ed. 1992).
236. See supra notes 173-175, 183-184 and accompanying text.
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federal offences were closely related in logic (though not "the same"),
and arose out of the same factual "transaction," there were good, nonvex-
atious reasons not to consolidate those offences into a single "hybrid"
trial. Within a given state, it is ordinarily23 7 easy enough for a state prose-
cutor to bundle all "transactional" state law charges together; but where
both state and federal law offences are implicated, bundling is far more
tricky. State and federal systems have traditionally had different prosecu-
tors appointed by different entities, different courts with differentjudges,
different rules of procedure and evidence and so on. A single hybrid
state-federal proceeding is imaginable; but a hybrid system would require
a major overhaul of traditional divisions between state and federal sys-
tems-and would raise knotty threshold questions of when different sov-
ereigns' different laws were nevertheless close enough to require a single
hybrid trial.
23 8
Of course, here too it looks as if we have recreated a kind of dual
sovereignty idea-this time under the Due Process Clause. The federal
government must explain why it chooses to prosecute a defendant twice
for different but related offences, and so must the state government-but
together the two governments need not explain very much; federalism
itself is the explanation. But as with collateral estoppel, the dual sover-
eignty look-alike here is rooted in a more general principle, and in a
functional analysis rather than a Heath-like definitional formalism. As we
saw in our earlier discussion of Dixon,239 the difficulty of transactional
bundling within a single jurisdiction could at times suffice to support sep-
arate prosecutions for different offences even by a single government.
And in our earlier double jeopardy dual sovereignty analysis, the special
functional problems of transactional bundling, knotty thresholds, and hy-
brid adjudication were nonissues. By hypothesis, we were dealing with
only a single offence-the same offence-and the only question was
whether a prosecution of an ordinary citizen for this offence would occur
in a state court applying state law or a federal court applying federal law.
Nevertheless, a sweeping post-incorporation assault on dual sover-
eignty might insist that in a world where federal and state governments
generally are presumed to, and do indeed, cooperate in investigating and
enforcing criminal law, they should also be obliged to cooperate in hy-
brid adjudication to prevent ordinary citizens from being whipsawed. But
once again, cases involving federal prosecutions of abusive state officials
should survive any general attack on dual sovereignty: The architecture
of the Fourteenth Amendment encourages unbundling here, allowing
states to clean up their own mess, with federal prosecution as a last resort
237. Ordinarily, but not always. See supra text accompanying notes 164-165, 182
(discussing neutral reasons for two trials in Dixon); supra note 190 (discussing possible
"local autonomy" reason for upholding two trials in Brown).
238. See Hoffman, supra note 60, at 657-58; Double Prosecution, supra note 21, at
1562.
239. See supra text accompanying notes 164-165, 182; see also supra note 190.
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if state efforts fail. If the feds can reprosecute for literally the same of-
fence in Section 5 cases, they should be allowed to prosecute different
offences a fortiori.
III. SKEWED JuRIES AND THE FINAuLIY OF JURY ACQUrrTALS
It remains to ask the hardest questions about the Rodney King
case-questions about racial justice and democracy in America. Suppose
that California were to try to reprosecute the acquitted officers for the
same (state law) offence on the theory that the initial acquittal in state
court was invalid because the Simi Valley jury was not properly consti-
tuted; the venue should never have been shifted to an area with so few
blacks, and defendants sought, and must thus bear responsibility for, this
improper venue transfer. Under current doctrine, California's hypotheti-
cal theory would clearly fail; but in this concluding section, we wonder
aloud-in a speculative vein-whether there might be some strong
things to say on behalf of this theory.
Under current double jeopardy jurisprudence, a verdict of acquittal,
even where the trial was plagued by pro-defendant error, is given special
significance. 240 Peter Westen and Richard Drubel discuss this asymmetry
in their classic article, "Toward a General Theory of Double Jeopardy."
24 1
They contrast the different treatment of erroneous convictions (where
retrial is permitted) and erroneous acquittals (where it is not) and sug-
gest that the only legitimate justification for the distinction is the historic
prerogative of the jury to acqpit against the evidence-that is, to nullify
the law.
242
But why should such a prerogative be protected where the jury itself
is suspect? When blacks are excluded from a jury in a racially charged
case where the victim is black and the defendants are white, must we al-
ways respect the jury's verdict or its prerogative? Consider, for example,
the emerging case law on race-based peremptory challenges. 243 Various
240. See, e.g., Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 503 (1978) ("[Ain acquitted
defendant may not be retried even though 'the acquittal was based upon an egregiously
erroneous foundation.'" (citation omitted)). But see Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S.
100, 134 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Justice Holmes, believing that the prosecution
was just as entitled as the defendant to an error-free trial, embraced the concept of
"continuingjeopardy" under which a defendant could be retried if error was found to have
prejudiced the prosecution's case.
241. See Westen & Drubel, supra note 147, at 122-55.
242. See id. at 129-31. The authors note, however, that courts do not permit defense
attorneys to instruct the jury about its nullification power. See id. at 131 & n.232.
243. See Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992) (criminal defendant cannot use
peremptory challenges to exclude jurors on account of race); Edmonson v. Leesville
Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991) (private litigants in civil cases cannot use peremptory
challenges to exclude jurors on account of race); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991)
(white criminal defendant has standing to bring equal protection claim on behalf of
excluded black juror); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (government's use of
peremptory challenges to exclude blacks on account of race violates Equal Protection
Clause); see alsoJ.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994) (government's use of
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recent decisions have recognized that race discrimination in jury selec-
tion corrodes the legal system and the practice of democratic govern-
ance. As Justice Kennedy wrote in his eloquent majority opinion in
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.: "Race discrimination within the court-
room raises serious questions as to the fairness of the proceedings con-
ducted there. Racial bias mars the integrity of the judicial system and
prevents the idea of democratic government from becoming a reality."244
Not much later, after riots erupted in Los Angeles and Florida, the Court
reemphasized the point: "Selection procedures that purposefully exclude
African Americans from juries undermine th [e] public confidence....
The need for public confidence is especially high in cases involving race-
related crimes . . . . [It] is essential for preserving community peace
"245
A. Jurors and Voters
The very legitimacy of the law depends on community participation
in its application and the belief that those responsible for selecting citi-
zens who will exercise such power are not deliberately preventing citizens
from participating on account of race.2 4 6 Racist selection procedures
prevent citizens from exercising their constitutional right to participate
in governing through the jury, just as they prevented blacks in years past
from exercising their other most important civic right-the vote. In-
deed, Justice Kennedy in Edmonson drew an apt analogy between the race-
based peremptory challenge and the white primary: "If a government
confers on a private body the power to choose the government's employ-
ees or officials, the private body will be bound by the constitutional man-
date of race-neutrality. "247
peremptory challenges to exclude men on account of gender violates Equal Protection
Clause).
244. Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 628.
245. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2353-54.
246. In dissent in Batson, Justice Rehnquist suggested that government prosecutors
could discriminate against blackjurors in case A because in case B, they might discriminate
against whites, and so it all equals out, see 476 U.S. at 137-39 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
This is a truly bad argument. Even assuming the dubious factual predicate of equal and
opposite discrimination is true, the logic plainly violates Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1
(1967) (miscegenation law is not saved because government prosecutes both races who
engage in it), and the general principle of colorblindness thatJustice Rehnquist elsewhere
invokes. Two wrongs do not make a right-and both race-based peremptories violate the
colorblindness principle. Though more subtly phrased, Justice Scalia's dissent in Powers,
499 U.S. at 423-26, is similarly flawed. What's more, a fixed number of peremptory
challenges will always diminish minority representation on a given jury more than majority
representation. And so, with due respect, the "it-all-equals-out" argument fails as a matter
of math as well as of constitutional principle.
247. Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 624. In Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953), the Court
considered the constitutionality of the Jaybird Democratic Association, which excluded
blacks from voting in elections it held each election year to select candidates for county
offices to run for nomination in the Democratic primary. For over 60 years theJaybird's
white candidates with few exceptions won the Democratic primaries unopposed and the
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The right to vote for officials and the right to serve (and to vote) on
juries are the two most important (and related) civic duties of our citi-
zens.2 48 Elections and juries are the places for active citizen participa-
tion; they provide the legitimacy our democratic system of government
requires for survival. Where citizens are excluded from participating be-
cause of their race, the verdicts ofjuries and elections are suspect.
Indeed, the Court has gone so far as to hold-repeatedly-that a
conviction delivered in an error-free trial by a properly constituted petit
jury is invalid where blacks were excluded from the pre-trial grand jury.
For example, in Rose v. Mitchell,249 the Court reasoned that where racial
discrimination in the grand juy exists, "[t]he harm is not only to the ac-
cused .... It is to society as a whole. . . .'[T]here is injury to the jury
system, to the law as an institution, to the community at large, and to the
democratic ideal reflected in the processes of our courts.' "250 Following
this reasoning, the Court found in later cases that race-based discrimina-
tion injury selection violates not only the defendant's rights, but also the
rights of excluded jurors to participate in governance in a place where
the constitutional authority of the government is most visibly
expressed.
25 1
Let us be clear: Rose condemned race discrimination in jury selec-
tion in a case where that condemnation helped the defendant. Yet might
the reasoning of Rose in some cases apply equally cogently to support the
people's right to one fair jury, untainted by wrongful racial exclusion?
Of course, under the Court's current doctrine, a finding that the
change of venue in the Rodney King case was an equal protection viola-
tion is unlikely. Yet the obvious analogy here is to peremptory chal-
lenges, the argument being that the change of venue accomplished what
peremptory challenges could (eliminating black jurors in Los Angeles
general elections that followed. See id. at 463. The Association had successfully managed
to render the vote of all blacks meaningless, thereby subverting democratic governance
according to the Court. Significantly, even though Jaybird was not a state actor, the Court
struck down its system as violative of the Fifteenth Amendment. "The effect of the whole
procedure . . . is to do precisely that which the Fifteenth Amendment forbids-strip
Negroes of every vestige of influence in selecting the officials who control the local county
matters that intimately touch the daily lives of citizens." Id. at 469-70.
248. For more discussion and analysis, see Vikram D. Amar, Jury Service as Political
Participation Akin to Voting, 80 Cornell L. Rev. (forthcoming 1995); Akhil Reed Amar,
The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 Yale LJ. 1131, 1182-99, 1202-03 (1991)
[hereinafter Amar, The Bill of Rights]; Akhil Reed Amar, Note, Choosing Representatives
by Lottery Voting, 93 Yale LJ. 1283, 1287-89 (1984). Under this analysis, the recent.E.B.
case involving sex-based peremptory challenges, discussed supra note 243, is best defended
as a Nineteenth Amendment case.
249. 443 U.S. 545 (1979).
250. Id. at 556 (quoting Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 195 (1946)). For a
long line of Supreme Court cases prior to Rose, see id. at 551 & n.3. For a more recent
reaffirmation of Rose, and still more cases, see Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 260-64
(1986).
251. See cases cited supra note 243.
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county) in one fell swoop. The argument is at least a respectable one
since the Court held in Georgia v. McColIum252 that the defendant is pro-
hibited from making race-based peremptory challenges. 253 Nonetheless,
this argument is more problematic in the Rodney King case, because the
defendants could not achieve the new venue, peremptorily, on their own,
but could only petition a court to move the trial. And in this petition,
defendants could rely on ostensibly neutral reasons-pretrial publicity
and superheated local politics-for their change-of-venue motion.
25 4
The trial judge's decision to move the trial to Ventura County could
likewise be subject to the rule of Batson v. Kentucky, which prohibited gov-
ernment officials from engaging in race-based peremptory challenges.
255
Yet because a single decision to move the trial does not represent a "pat-
tern of strikes,"256 the prosecution would have a difficult time making out
a prima facie case of discrimination, and the burden of explanation
would probably never shift to thejudge.2 57 Even if it did, the judge could
also present several ostensibly neutral rationales for the change of
venue-such as cost and convenience to the parties-and thus deflect
accusations of deliberate discrimination (charges that otherjudges would
probably be loathe to direct against a fellow judicial officer in any event).
But assume for the sake of argument that the venue transfer could
be shown to be constitutional error. The error here would be unique,
going to the integrity of the jury itself. This is not a case where the jury
was denied incriminating evidence, but rather a case where, on account
of the selection process, the jury itself might not be trusted to provide a
just and impartial verdict, a verdict representing not part, but all of the
community.258 Arguably, Westen and Drubel's idea about the jury's pre-
252. 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2359 (1992).
253. See, e.g., M. Shanara Gilbert, An Ounce of Prevention: A Constitutional
Prescription for Choice of Venue in Racially Sensitive Criminal Cases, 67 Tul. L. Rev. 1855,
1918-30 (1993) (undertaking Batson-McCollum equal protection analysis); Note, Out of the
Frying Pan or into the Fire: Race and Choice of Venue After Rodney King, 106 Harv. L.
Rev. 705, 716-19 (1993) (same) [hereinafter Out of the Frying Pan].
254. On the flimsiness of these claims as grounds for venue transfer, see Hoffman,
supra note 60, at 681-84.
255. See 476 U.S. 79 (1986). This rule providesf that race-based peremptory
challenges by the prosecutor violate the Fourteenth Amendment and requires the
prosecutor to offer neutral reasons for eliminating black jurors where the defense has
established that a pattern of strikes has been made against blacks. The percentage of
blacks in Los Angeles County was 11.2%, whereas in Ventura County it was 2.3%. See Out
of the Frying Pan, supra note 253, at 705 n.4.
256. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97.
257. To complicate matters further, the decision that venue must be moved was made
by one set of judges (a California Appellate Court) and the ultimate decision where to
move was made by a different judge (the trial judge). See Levenson, supra note 120, at
525.
258. If the jury is, as de Tocqueville observed, "above all a political institution,"juries
must be impartial not merely in a narrow adjudicatory sense, but also in a political sense,
representing all of the polity. See 1 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 293
(1945). The opposite of impartial here is not simple partiality to one of the parties in the
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rogative to nullify the law should not apply where skewed selection proce-
dures create real doubts that the jury seeks justice and speaks for the
people.
B. Defendant-Induced Error
Not only was there a unique kind of error bearing on the legitimacy
of the jury, but it was induced by the defendants, who filed the motion for
a change of venue. Where an error is defendant-induced, the Double
Jeopardy Clause arguably provides the defendant less protection. The
Court's mistrial case law is illustrative.
In Oregon v. Kennedy,259 the Court ruled that the "classical test" for
determining whether the Double Jeopardy Clause bars a second trial after
the first trial is terminated over the defendant's objection has "no place"
where the mistrial is declared "at the behest of the defendant."260 Rather
than applying the "manifest necessity" standard that makes it difficult for
the state to justify reprosecution, the Court adopted an intent test
whereby a retrial would be barred only where the prosecutor intended to
" 'goad' the defendant into moving for a mistrial."261 Thus, if the defend-
ant is responsible for terminating the initial trial, he has essentially waived
a double jeopardy claim. The Court applied the same principle in United
States v. Scott,2 62 reasoning that "this language from Green [describing the
harms against which the Double Jeopardy Clause protects] ... is not a
principle which can be expanded to include situations in which the de-
fendant is responsible for the second prosecution." 263 The Court held that
the defendant may lose the right to have his guilt decided by the first jury
empaneled to try him where he is responsible for terminating the trial on
grounds unrelated to guilt or innocence. 264
These decisions indicate that a defendant's double jeopardy rights
are very much a function of the strategic ch'oices he or she makes both
before and during trial, such as the decision to seek or oppose a mistrial.
If those choices interfere with a prosecutor's right to "one full and fair
opportunity to present his evidence to an impartial jury,"265 then the de-
fendant's double jeopardy claim may be unavailing.
2 66
case, but partisanship more broadly-juries representing only one race, or gender, or
political party. See generally Gary Wills, Explaining America: The Federalist 193-215
(1981) (discussing party and faction).
259. 456 U.S. 667 (1982).
260. Id. at 672.
261. Id. at 676.
262. 437 U.S. 82 (1978).
263. Id. at 95-96 (emphasis added).
264. See id. at 87.
265. Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 505 (1978).
266. For reasons similar to those outlined in Part II, supra, it might be argued that
mistrial cases implicate due process principles in tandem with the spirit underlying the
Double Jeopardy Clause, but not the strict words of the Double Jeopardy Clause itself. On
this reading, the Double Jeopardy Clause, strictly speaking, only applies-jeopardy only
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While the principle of Kennedy and Scott is clear, its scope extends
only so far. Neither case involved an acquittal by a jury. And the
Supreme Court has never yet upset a jury verdict of acquittal, even if the
defendant is responsible for substantial legal error. Because a jury does
not often disclose its reasons for reaching a verdict, its prerogative to ac-
quit against the evidence would be upset by a rule permitting invalidation
of acquittal in cases plagued by pro-defendant legal error. Nonetheless,
where the defendant-induced error undermines the very status of the jury
as a properly constituted body, grounds arguably exist for disregarding its
verdict and permitting retrial.
C. Tainted Acquittals
Disregarding a tainted acquittal would not be wholly illogical or un-
precedented. In many state courts, acting under double jeopardy clauses
in state constitutions or analogous common-law principles, it seems that a
judgment of acquittal procured by an accused by fraud or collusion is a
nullity and does not put defendant in jeopardy. Consequently, it does
not bar a second trial for the same offence.267 This proposition is sup-
"attaches"-after a verdict in the first trial, which may be pled in any subsequent trial. In
order to prevent a prosecutor who thinks she is losing the first case from deliberately or
negligently causing a mistrial-and thereby evading the first jury's right to acquit with
finality-courts must craft a flexible but penumbral body of rules prohibiting prosecution-
induced retrials. See Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 188 (1957). But this body of
rules, in its nature, cannot be as absolute as the Double Jeopardy Clause mandate, strictly
speaking. Sometimes, a second trial may proceed after a mistrial-as where ajuror falls ill
during the first trial. Rather than saying that jeopardy "attaches" early in the trial, but is
not absolute; we should say that jeopardy attaches only after a verdict, but due process
principles and penumbral double jeopardy principles bar prosecutorial manipulation of
mistrials. Under this logic, we need not, strictly speaking, single out any magic moment of
attachment pre-verdict; a sliding scale could presume increasing potential for prosecutorial
manipulation as the first trial proceeds along, see Westen & Drubel, supra note 147, at
98-99. Alternatively, doctrine could give great, but not necessarily dispositive weight to
certain key events, such as the impanelling of the first jury, cf. Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28,
32-36 (1978) (jeopardy attaches when jury is impanelled and sworn). This nonattachment
approach would be more in keeping with the absolute but narrow text of the Double
Jeopardy Clause, with the views of Joseph Story's classic Commentaries on the
Constitution, and with English practice, see Amar, The Bill of Rights, supra note 248, at
1190 n.261. It would also accord with early American case law. See, e.g., United States v.
Haskell, 26 F. Cas. 207, 212 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 15,321) (Washington, Cir. J.)
("jeopardy" means "nothing short of the acquittal or conviction of the prisoner, and the
judgment of the court thereupon."); People v. Olcott, 2 Johns. Cas. 301 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1801) (Kent, J.) (discharge of jury before verdict does not bar further prosecution); see
also Crist, 437 U.S. at 49 (Powell,J., dissenting) (discussing history of American attachment
rules).
267. See, e.g., State ex rel. Curtis v. Heflin, 96 So. 459, 462 (Ala. Ct. App. 1923); State
v. Ketchum, 167 S.W. 73, 75 (Ark. 1914); State v. Caldwell, 66 S.W. 150, 152 (Ark. 1902);
State v. Lee, 30 A. 1110, 1111 (Conn. 1894); State v. Brown, 16 Conn. 54, 58 (1843); State
v. Green, 16 Iowa 239, 242-43 (1864); Edwards v. Commonwealth, 25 S.W.2d 746, 747 (Ky.
1930); Sexton v. Commonwealth, 236 S.W. 956, 957 (Ky. 1922); Smith v. State, 69 So. 2d
837, 839 (Miss. 1954); Price v. State, 61 So. 314, 314 (Miss. 1913); State v. Little, 1 N.H. 257,
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ported by various distinguished treatises, and even appears in CorpusJuris
Secundum as a rule of hornbook law.268 And the proposition has consid-
erable common sense to commend it. If a defendant on trial for murder
bribes his jury and wins acquittal, and in a subsequent prosecution this
bribery is proved beyond a reasonable doubt, should the double jeopardy
principle absolutely bar retrial for murder? If so, the defendant will have,
in a sense, gotten away with murder simply by compounding his crime
with bribery.2
69
Of course, we have earlier expressed great reservations about ad hoc
exceptions to explicit constitutional rights; and so it remains to ask how a
bribery exception might be rooted in constitutional text or general legal
norms, and whether the principled logic of a bribery exception would
extend to cases involving racially stacked juries.
Two main lines of argument appear to undergird the bribery excep-
tion. The first never gets to the Double Jeopardy Clause. It simply pre-
vents a defendant from raising the issue. 270 Call it what you will-estop-
pel, fraud, unclean hands, waiver, or forfeiture-the basic idea, rooted in
general legal principles, is that defendant's own prior misconduct bars
him from asserting a double jeopardy claim. (And here we see again how
estoppel typically runs against one party rather than in favor of his oppo-
nent, creating a disability in him rather than a right in the other.)
The second argument is more textual. If the jury was bribed, the
defendant was never truly in jeopardy. The fix was in, and he ran no risk,
suffered no jeopardy-from the French jeu-perdre, a game that one might
lose, and the Middle English iuparti, an uncertain game.271 On this the-
ory, a second trial would truly put defendant in jeopardy not "twice" but
only once, in keeping with the textual command.
What does all this mean in the race-stacking context? Where defend-
ant convinces ajudge to erroneously transfer a case, it's hard to see clever
lawyering as the estopping equivalent of fraud or bribery. Where the de-
258 (1818); State v. Swepson, 79 N.C. 632, 641 (1878); State v. Howell, 66 S.E.2d 701, 706
(S.C. 1951); State v. Reid, 479 N.W.2d 572 (Wis. CL App. 1991); McFarland v. State, 32
N.W. 226, 227-28 (Wis. 1887). Many of these discussions are dicta.
268. See 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 217 (1989); 1 Joel P. Bishop, Commentaries on the
Criminal Law § 678, at 699-700 & n.3 (1858); 2 Francis Wharton, A Treatise on Criminal
Procedure § 1381, at 1837-38 & n.2 (10th ed. 1918); 2 Francis Wharton, A Treatise on the
Law of Evidence in Criminal Issues § 579, at 1190 & n.8 (10th ed. 1912). Each of these
treatises cites many cases. See also Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 161 (1959) (Black, J.,
dissenting) ("Sham trials, as well as those by courts without jurisdiction, have been
considered by courts and commentators not to be jeopardy, and might therefore not bar
subsequent convictions.").
269. One possible solution would be to allow bribery to be punished as severely as the
murder for which the defendant was never convicted. Yet this alternative is problematic
since, even after conviction for bribery, there has never been a fair adjudication of whether
the defendant in fact committed the murder.
270. Cf. Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. 1 (1987) (by knowingly violating his plea
bargain agreement, defendant in effect forfeited his double jeopardy objection).
271. See 8 The Oxford English Dictionary 214 (2d ed. 1989).
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fendant achieves the same result through unconstitutional peremptory
challenges, the issue is closer. The defendant himself has acted unconsti-
tutionally; on the other hand, his actions take place in open court-a far
cry from secret jury tampering-and are not criminal.
So much for estoppel. The "no true jeopardy" argument is even
more interesting in the race-stacking context. Reading the bribery para-
digm narrowly, we might say that jury-stacking is very different from jury-
bribing. The latter eliminates all suspense, but the former only tips the
odds towards defendant. Even loaded dice are a chancy-uncertain-
proposition; and a trial before even a friendly jury is a game that defend-
ant might lose.
But there is a different "no jeopardy" argument that might support a
'jury-stacking" exception to autrefois acquit. Where a jury is racially
rigged, perhaps it is not a true jury. The very idea of the jury, constitu-
tionally speaking, is a body that represents the people-all the people-
by constituting a fair cross-section, an impartial sample, of the whole pol-
ity.272 Unconstitutional racial stacking destroys the very essence of ajury
and, in effect, deprives the jury of its very representative status, itsjurisdic-
tion, its right to decide. If this argument works, a stacked jury is, constitu-
tionally speaking, no jury; its acquittal, no acquittal; and so defendant, as
a result of his own race-stacking, was never constitutionally in jeopardy.
Taken to its logical conclusion, this argument might seem to prove
too much. Any time an appellate tribunal or a second court wanted to
disregard ajury verdict, it might be said, casuistically: "Juries are bodies
that are designed to reach the right result. Since this result is obviously
wrong [in our view] it couldn't have come from a true jury, and thus,
defendant was not truly in jeopardy." But this logic is faulty. Ajury does
not always get it right. Jurisdiction, in a key sense, is the right to decide
either way, and thus in a certain sense the right to be wrong (from a
God's eye perspective, or the perspective of a later court).273 A roughly
analogous distinction is well-established in contempt case law, where an
incorrect decision cannot be collaterally challenged in many instances,
but a decision rendered without jurisdiction-by an improper deci-
272. We are not claiming that blacks must actually sit on any given jury; but they may
not be systematically excluded-the process ofjury selection may not be stacked against
any group. So too, blacks need not vote in any election; but they may not be systematically
excluded from the voting process.
For more discussion of the cross-sectional and democratic ideal of the jury, see Akhil
Reed Amar, Reinventing Juries: Ten Suggested Reforms, 28 U.C. Davis L. Rev.
(forthcoming 1995).
273. See Akhil Reed Amar & Neal Kumar Katyal, Executive Privileges and Immunities:
The Nixon and Clinton Cases, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 702, 710 n.36 (1995).
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sionmaker-often can be.2 74 And our argument here is that a racially
stacked jury may be just such an improper decisionmaker.
2 75
D. Reconstructing Double Jeopardy (Again)
But how, it might be asked, could it be that an exception to autrefois
acquit in the case of a racially stacked jury might lie coiled near the core
of the Double Jeopardy Clause, unnoticed for two centuries in America?
If a racially-stacked-jury exception is even plausible, why did the issue not
bubble up to the Court long ago?
To answer these last questions, we must reflect on how constitutional
law works itself pure, always moving towards a horizon where (one hopes)
different clauses cohere into an integrated whole-where it is "a
Constitution" and not merely a jumble of separate clauses, that we are
expounding. In Part I of this article, we saw how the Double Jeopardy
Clause must be read in light of the Fourteenth Amendment-alongside
other post-incorporation cases under the Fourth Amendment and the
Self-Incrimination Clause, and Section 5 cases like Screws.2
76 Similarly, in
Part II, we saw how the Due Process Clause and the Double Jeopardy
Clause work side by side, and how certain ideas should be taken out of
the Double Jeopardy Clause, precisely because they fit so much more
snugly into the Due Process Clause. And here, in Part III, we see once
again how constitutional ideas outside the Double Jeopardy Clause might
influence interpretation of the Clause itself.
The key linkages here are those between the DoubleJeopardy Clause
and the provisions establishing the role of the criminal jury (Article III
and the Sixth Amendment, now of course made applicable to states via
Fourteenth Amendment incorporation 2 77); and the linkages, in turn, be-
tween juries and the constitutional ideal of democratic political participa-
tion embodied in, for example, the Fifteenth Amendment.
2 7 8
The Double Jeopardy Clause in America has always, in important re-
spects, piggybacked onto the right ofjury trial in criminal cases. The two
ideas work in tandem, as do the two clauses of the Seventh Amendment
274. For emphasis on the necessity of the first court's havingjurisdiction to support a
plea of autrefois acquit in a second proceeding, see 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries
*335, quoted supra text accompanying note 31; 2 Hawkins, supra note 3, at 368, 372;
United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 669 (1896). On contempt and the collateral bar rule,
see, e.g., Walkerv. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967) (injunction issuing from court
with jurisdiction generally cannot be collaterally attacked, even if substantially
unconstitutional).
275. Cf. Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 263-64 (1986) (plurality opinion)
(distinguishing between errors, like racial discrimination in jury selection, that
"undermine[ the structural integrity of the criminal tribunal itself" and other errors that
do not; former can never be seen as "harmless error"); Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S.
279, 310 (1991) (similar).
276. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
277. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
278. See generally Vikram D. Amar, supra note 248.
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specifying first, a right of civil jury trial, and second, limits on subsequent
actors' power to overturn the jury's verdict.279 As Westen and Drubel
point out, the absolute finality of jury acquittals ultimately draws its
strength from certain historical and structural ideas about the constitu-
tional role ofjuries-Sixth Amendment ideas, and not just double jeop-
ardy ideas.2 0 (This is why pro-defendant decisions by judges are not as
final in double jeopardy case law as pro-defendant decisions by juries. 281)
And so once the Supreme Court begins to rethink the underlying right of
jury trial, the Court must rethink double jeopardy too.
The Court's recent cases do indeed appear to be rethinking the jury
trial, shifting from a view emphasizing the defendant's right to be tried by
a jury towards one stressing citizens' right to serve on and to vote in a
jury. This shift, in turn, finds strong support in a Fifteenth Amendment
vision emphasizing the right of blacks to equal political participation-
the right to vote for legislatures, but also injuries, free from race-based
exclusion.28 2 Though the Court may not yet realize it, the deep logic of
this shift may require revising ancient Double Jeopardy Clause ideas.
And so just as the Fourteenth Amendment and Benton283 required
rethinking dual sovereignty in Part I, so the Fifteenth Amendment and
279. "[T]he right of trial byjury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by ajury, shall be
otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the
common law." U.S. Const. amend. VII.
The only state constitutional precursor of the Double Jeopardy Clause conjoined this
provision to its criminal jury trial guarantee. See N.H. Const. of 1784 pt. 1, art. I, § XVI,
reprinted in Sources of Our Liberties 384 (Richard L. Perry &John C. Cooper eds., 1978).
A century earlier the colony of Pennsylvania had anticipated the double jeopardy principle
by providing that the jury "shall have the final judgment." Pa. Const. of 1682 art. VIII
("Laws Agreed Upon in England, & C"), reprinted in Sources of Our Liberties, supra, at
217. The Maryland state ratifing convention-one of only two that raised the double
jeopardy issue-made this linkage even more explicit: "That there shall be a trial by jury
in all criminal cases... and that there be no appeal from matter of fact, or second trial
after acquittal." This clause was immediately followed by a proto-Seventh Amendment bar
on appellate relitigation of facts found by a civil jury. See 2 The Debates in the Several
State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution 550 (Jonathan Elliot ed.,
1876). For further evidence of linkages between the Sixth and Seventh Amendments, and
the DoubleJeopardy Clause, see Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 170 (1873); 2 The
Complete Anti-Federalist 432 (HerbertJ. Storing ed., 1981) (Essays of Brutus); id. at 70
(Luther Martin's Genuine Information); see also 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries
*361 (proclaiming, in section discussing jury trial, that "if the jury therefore find the
prisoner not guilty, he is then for ever quit and discharged of the accusation").
280. See Westen & Drubel, supra note 147, at 124-32, 133 & n.241; see also Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 200 n.50 (1976) (plurality opinion) (linking Sixth Amendment and
DoubleJeopardy Clause); Peter Westen, The Three Faces of DoubleJeopardy: Reflections
on Government Appeals of Criminal Sentences, 78 Mich. L. Rev. 1001, 1012-23, 1033-34
& n.99 (1980) (same).
281. See Westen & Drubel, supra note 147, at 132-55; Westen, supra note 280, at
1064-65.
282. See generally Vikram D. Amar, supra note 248..
283. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
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Powers/Edmonson284 may require rethinking the absolute finality of jury
acquittals. Here too, we must, perhaps, Reconstruct double jeopardy.
284. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500
U.S. 614 (1991).
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